Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in
Menu
Find a journal Publish with us
Search
Cart
Book cover

International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust

POST 2012: Principles of Security and Trust pp 69–88Cite as

  1. Home
  2. Principles of Security and Trust
  3. Conference paper
Verification of Security Protocols with Lists: From Length One to Unbounded Length

Verification of Security Protocols with Lists: From Length One to Unbounded Length

  • Miriam Paiola18 &
  • Bruno Blanchet18 
  • Conference paper
  • 1171 Accesses

  • 4 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 7215)

Abstract

We present a novel, simple technique for proving secrecy properties for security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, for an unbounded number of sessions. More specifically, our technique relies on the Horn clause approach used in the automatic verifier ProVerif: we show that if a protocol is proven secure by our technique with lists of length one, then it is secure for lists of unbounded length. Interestingly, this theorem relies on approximations made by our verification technique: in general, secrecy for lists of length one does not imply secrecy for lists of unbounded length. Our result can be used in particular to prove secrecy properties for group protocols with an unbounded number of participants and for some XML protocols (web services) with ProVerif.

Keywords

  • Security Property
  • Horn Clause
  • Group Protocol
  • Cryptographic Primitive
  • Unbounded Number

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Download conference paper PDF

References

  1. Abadi, M., Blanchet, B.: Analyzing Security Protocols with Secrecy Types and Logic Programs. Journal of the ACM 52(1), 102–146 (2005)

    CrossRef  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Asokan, N., Ginzboorg, P.: Key agreement in ad hoc networks. Computer Communications 23(17), 1627–1637 (2000)

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  3. Bachmair, L., Ganzinger, H.: Resolution theorem proving. In: Handbook of Automated Reasoning, vol. 1, ch. 2, pp. 19–100. North Holland (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Blanchet, B.: Using Horn clauses for analyzing security protocols. In: Cortier, V., Kremer, S. (eds.) Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols. Cryptology and Information Security Series, vol. 5, pp. 86–111. IOS Press, Amsterdam (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bryans, J., Schneider, S.: CSP, PVS and recursive authentication protocol. In: DIMACS Workshop on Formal Verification of Security Protocols (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Chridi, N., Turuani, M., Rusinowitch, M.: Constraints-based Verification of Parameterized Cryptographic Protocols. Research Report RR-6712, INRIA (2008), http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00336539/en/

  7. Chridi, N., Turuani, M., Rusinowitch, M.: Decidable analysis for a class of cryptographic group protocols with unbounded lists. In: CSF 2009, pp. 277–289. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-29(12), 198–208 (1983)

    CrossRef  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Eastlake, D., Reagle, J.: XML encryption syntax and processing. W3C Candidate Recommendation (2002), http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/CR-xmlenc-core-20020802/

  10. Goubault-Larrecq, J.: Une fois qu’on n’a pas trouvé de preuve, comment le faire comprendre à un assistant de preuve? In: JFLA 2004, pp. 1–20. INRIA (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Kremer, S., Mercier, A., Treinen, R.: Proving Group Protocols Secure Against Eavesdroppers. In: Armando, A., Baumgartner, P., Dowek, G. (eds.) IJCAR 2008. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 5195, pp. 116–131. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  12. Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: Using ProVerif to analyze protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. In: CSF 2009, pp. 157–171. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: On the Automatic Analysis of Recursive Security Protocols with XOR. In: Thomas, W., Weil, P. (eds.) STACS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4393, pp. 646–657. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  14. Meadows, C.: Extending formal cryptographic protocol analysis techniques for group protocols and low-level cryptographic primitives. In: WITS 2000 (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Meadows, C., Syverson, P., Cervesato, I.: Formal specification and analysis of the Group Domain of Interpretation protocol using NPATRL and the NRL protocol analyzer. Journal of Computer Security 12(6), 893–931 (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Meadows, C., Narendran, P.: A unification algorithm for the group Diffie-Hellman protocol. In: WITS 2002 (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Paulson, L.C.: Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol. In: CSFW 1997, pp. 84–95. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Pereira, O., Quisquater, J.J.: Some attacks upon authenticated group key agreement protocols. Journal of Computer Security 11(4), 555–580 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Pereira, O., Quisquater, J.J.: Generic insecurity of cliques-type authenticated group key agreement protocols. In: CSFW 2004, pp. 16–19. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Steel, G., Bundy, A.: Attacking group protocols by refuting incorrect inductive conjectures. Journal of Automated Reasoning 36(1-2), 149–176 (2006)

    CrossRef  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Steiner, M., Tsudik, G., Waidner, M.: CLIQUES: A new approach to group key agreement. In: ICDCS 1998, pp. 380–387. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Truderung, T.: Selecting Theories and Recursive Protocols. In: Abadi, M., de Alfaro, L. (eds.) CONCUR 2005. LNCS, vol. 3653, pp. 217–232. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. INRIA, École Normale Supérieure, CNRS, Paris, France

    Miriam Paiola & Bruno Blanchet

Authors
  1. Miriam Paiola
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Bruno Blanchet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Pisa, Largo Bruno Pontecorvo, 3, 56127, Pisa, Italy

    Pierpaolo Degano

  2. Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 100 Institute Road, 01609, Worcester, MA, USA

    Joshua D. Guttman

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Paiola, M., Blanchet, B. (2012). Verification of Security Protocols with Lists: From Length One to Unbounded Length. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds) Principles of Security and Trust. POST 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7215. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_5

Download citation

  • .RIS
  • .ENW
  • .BIB
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-28640-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-28641-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Share this paper

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

Search

Navigation

  • Find a journal
  • Publish with us

Discover content

  • Journals A-Z
  • Books A-Z

Publish with us

  • Publish your research
  • Open access publishing

Products and services

  • Our products
  • Librarians
  • Societies
  • Partners and advertisers

Our imprints

  • Springer
  • Nature Portfolio
  • BMC
  • Palgrave Macmillan
  • Apress
  • Your US state privacy rights
  • Accessibility statement
  • Terms and conditions
  • Privacy policy
  • Help and support

167.114.118.210

Not affiliated

Springer Nature

© 2023 Springer Nature