Abstract
Security protocol verification has been a very active research area since the 1990s. This paper surveys various approaches in this area, considering the verification in the symbolic model, as well as the more recent approaches that rely on the computational model or that verify protocol implementations rather than specifications. Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.
Keywords
- Security Protocol
- Security Property
- Computer Security
- Symbolic Model
- Horn Clause
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Download conference paper PDF
References
Abadi, M.: Secrecy by typing in security protocols. Journal of the ACM 46(5), 749–786 (1999)
Abadi, M., Blanchet, B.: Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs. Journal of the ACM 52(1), 102–146 (2005)
Abadi, M., Blanchet, B.: Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified email. Science of Computer Programming 58(1-2), 3–27 (2005)
Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., Fournet, C.: Just Fast Keying in the pi calculus. ACM TISSEC 10(3), 1–59 (2007)
Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Mobile values, new names, and secure communication. In: POPL 2001, pp. 104–115. ACM, New York (2001)
Abadi, M., Gordon, A.D.: A bisimulation method for cryptographic protocols. Nordic Journal of Computing 5(4), 267–303 (1998)
Abadi, M., Gordon, A.D.: A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus. Information and Computation 148(1), 1–70 (1999)
Abadi, M., Rogaway, P.: Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational soundness of formal encryption). Journal of Cryptology 15(2), 103–127 (2002)
Abdalla, M., Fouque, P.A., Pointcheval, D.: Password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting. IEE Proceedings Information Security 153(1), 27–39 (2006)
Adão, P., Bana, G., Herzog, J., Scedrov, A.: Soundness of Formal Encryption in the Presence of Key-Cycles. In: de Capitani di Vimercati, S., Syverson, P., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3679, pp. 374–396. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Affeldt, R., Nowak, D., Yamada, K.: Certifying assembly with formal cryptographic proofs: the case of BBS. In: AVoCS 2009. Electronic Communications of the EASST, vol. 23. EASST (2009)
Aizatulin, M., Gordon, A.D., Jürjens, J.: Extracting and verifying cryptographic models from C protocol code by symbolic execution. In: CCS 2011, pp. 331–340. ACM, New York (2011)
Allamigeon, X., Blanchet, B.: Reconstruction of attacks against cryptographic protocols. In: CSFW 2005, pp. 140–154. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2005)
Arapinis, M., Duflot, M.: Bounding Messages for Free in Security Protocols. In: Arvind, V., Prasad, S. (eds.) FSTTCS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4855, pp. 376–387. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Arapinis, M., Ritter, E., Ryan, M.D.: StatVerif: Verification of stateful processes. In: CSF 2011, pp. 33–47. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2011)
Armando, A., Compagna, L., Ganty, P.: SAT-Based Model-Checking of Security Protocols Using Planning Graph Analysis. In: Araki, K., Gnesi, S., Mandrioli, D. (eds.) FME 2003. LNCS, vol. 2805, pp. 875–893. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Armando, A., Basin, D., Boichut, Y., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J., Drielsma, P.H., Heám, P.C., Kouchnarenko, O., Mantovani, J., Mödersheim, S., von Oheimb, D., Rusinowitch, M., Santiago, J., Turuani, M., Viganò, L., Vigneron, L.: The AVISPA Tool for the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications. In: Etessami, K., Rajamani, S.K. (eds.) CAV 2005. LNCS, vol. 3576, pp. 281–285. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Bachmair, L., Ganzinger, H.: Resolution theorem proving. In: Handbook of Automated Reasoning, vol. 1, ch. 2, pp. 19–100. North-Holland (2001)
Backes, M., Cortesi, A., Maffei, M.: Causality-based abstraction of multiplicity in security protocols. In: CSF 2007, pp. 355–369. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2007)
Backes, M., Hofheinz, D., Unruh, D.: CoSP: A general framework for computational soundness proofs. In: CCS 2009, pp. 66–78. ACM, New York (2009)
Backes, M., Hritcu, C., Maffei, M.: Automated verification of remote electronic voting protocols in the applied pi-calculus. In: CSF 2008, pp. 195–209. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2008)
Backes, M., Laud, P.: Computationally sound secrecy proofs by mechanized flow analysis. In: CCS 2006, pp. 370–379. ACM, New York (2006)
Backes, M., Maffei, M., Unruh, D.: Zero-knowledge in the applied pi-calculus and automated verification of the direct anonymous attestation protocol. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 202–215. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2008)
Backes, M., Maffei, M., Unruh, D.: Computationally sound verification of source code. In: CCS 2010, pp. 387–398. ACM, New York (2010)
Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B.: Symmetric encryption in a simulatable Dolev-Yao style cryptographic library. In: CSFW 2004, pp. 204–218. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2004)
Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B.: Relating symbolic and cryptographic secrecy. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 2(2), 109–123 (2005)
Backes, M., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: A composable cryptographic library with nested operations. In: CCS 2003, pp. 220–230. ACM, New York (2003)
Backes, M., Pfiztmann, B., Scedrov, A.: Key-dependent message security under active attacks—BRSIM/UC soundness of symbolic encryption with key cycles. In: CSF 2007, pp. 112–124. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2007)
Backes, M., Unruh, D.: Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs against active attackers. In: CSF 2008, pp. 255–269. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2008)
Barthe, G., Daubignard, M., Kapron, B., Lakhnech, Y.: Computational indistinguishability logic. In: CCS 2010, pp. 375–386. ACM, New York (2010)
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Lakhnech, Y., Zanella Béguelin, S.: Beyond Provable Security Verifiable IND-CCA Security of OAEP. In: Kiayias, A. (ed.) CT-RSA 2011. LNCS, vol. 6558, pp. 180–196. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Heraud, S., Zanella Béguelin, S.: Formal Certification of ElGamal Encryption. A Gentle Introduction to CertiCrypt. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J., Martinelli, F. (eds.) FAST 2008. LNCS, vol. 5491, pp. 1–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Heraud, S., Béguelin, S.Z.: Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 71–90. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Zanella, S.: Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs. In: POPL 2009, pp. 90–101. ACM, New York (2009)
Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: An On-the-Fly Model-Checker for Security Protocol Analysis. In: Snekkenes, E., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2808, pp. 253–270. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Baudet, M.: Sécurité des protocoles cryptographiques: aspects logiques et calculatoires. Ph.D. thesis, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan (2007)
Béguelin, S.Z., Barthe, G., Heraud, S., Grégoire, B., Hedin, D.: A machine-checked formalization of sigma-protocols. In: CSF 2010, pp. 246–260. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2010)
Béguelin, S.Z., Grégoire, B., Barthe, G., Olmedo, F.: Formally certifying the security of digital signature schemes. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 237–250. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)
Bellare, M., Desai, A., Jokipii, E., Rogaway, P.: A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption. In: FOCS 1997, pp. 394–403. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1997)
Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated Key Exchange Secure against Dictionary Attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity Authentication and Key Distribution. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232–249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: The Security of Triple Encryption and a Framework for Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4004, pp. 409–426. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Bengtson, J., Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Gordon, A., Maffeis, S.: Refinement types for secure implementations. ACM TOPLAS 33(2) (2011)
Bhargavan, K., Corin, R., Fournet, C., Zălinescu, E.: Cryptographically verified implementations for TLS. In: CCS 2008, pp. 459–468. ACM, New York (2008)
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Gordon, A.: Modular verification of security protocol code by typing. In: POPL 2010, pp. 445–456. ACM, New York (2010)
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Gordon, A., Tse, S.: Verified interoperable implementations of security protocols. ACM TOPLAS 31(1) (2008)
Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Gordon, A.D., Pucella, R.: TulaFale: A Security Tool for Web Services. In: de Boer, F.S., Bonsangue, M.M., Graf, S., de Roever, W.-P. (eds.) FMCO 2003. LNCS, vol. 3188, pp. 197–222. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Blanchet, B.: Automatic verification of cryptographic protocols: A logic programming approach. In: PPDP 2003, pp. 1–3. ACM, New York (2003)
Blanchet, B.: Automatic proof of strong secrecy for security protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 86–100. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2004)
Blanchet, B.: Security protocols: From linear to classical logic by abstract interpretation. Information Processing Letters 95(5), 473–479 (2005)
Blanchet, B.: Computationally sound mechanized proofs of correspondence assertions. In: CSF 2007, pp. 97–111. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2007)
Blanchet, B.: A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing 5(4), 193–207 (2008)
Blanchet, B.: Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols. Journal of Computer Security 17(4), 363–434 (2009)
Blanchet, B.: Using Horn clauses for analyzing security protocols. In: Cortier, V., Kremer, S. (eds.) Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols. Cryptology and Information Security Series, vol. 5, pp. 86–111. IOS Press, Amsterdam (2011)
Blanchet, B., Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Automated verification of selected equivalences for security protocols. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 75(1), 3–51 (2008)
Blanchet, B., Chaudhuri, A.: Automated formal analysis of a protocol for secure file sharing on untrusted storage. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 417–431. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2008)
Blanchet, B., Jaggard, A.D., Scedrov, A., Tsay, J.K.: Computationally sound mechanized proofs for basic and public-key Kerberos. In: ASIACCS 2008, pp. 87–99. ACM, New York (2008)
Blanchet, B., Podelski, A.: Verification of cryptographic protocols: Tagging enforces termination. Theoretical Computer Science 333(1-2), 67–90 (2005)
Blanchet, B., Pointcheval, D.: Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 537–554. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Bodei, C., Buchholtz, M., Degano, P., Nielson, F., Nielson, H.R.: Automatic validation of protocol narration. In: CSFW 2003, pp. 126–140. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2003)
Bodei, C., Buchholtz, M., Degano, P., Nielson, F., Nielson, H.R.: Static validation of security protocols. Journal of Computer Security 13(3), 347–390 (2005)
Bodei, C., Degano, P., Nielson, F., Nielson, H.R.: Flow logic for Dolev-Yao secrecy in cryptographic processes. Future Generation Comp. Syst. 18(6), 747–756 (2002)
Boichut, Y., Kosmatov, N., Vigneron, L.: Validation of Prouvé protocols using the automatic tool TA4SP. In: TFIT 2006, pp. 467–480 (2006)
Bolignano, D.: Towards a Mechanization of Cryptographic Protocol Verification. In: Grumberg, O. (ed.) CAV 1997. LNCS, vol. 1254, pp. 131–142. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Borgström, J., Briais, S., Nestmann, U.: Symbolic Bisimulation in the Spi Calculus. In: Gardner, P., Yoshida, N. (eds.) CONCUR 2004. LNCS, vol. 3170, pp. 161–176. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Bozga, L., Lakhnech, Y., Périn, M.: Pattern-based abstraction for verifying secrecy in protocols. International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT) 8(1), 57–76 (2006)
Broadfoot, P.J., Roscoe, A.W.: Embedding agents within the intruder to detect parallel attacks. Journal of Computer Security 12(3/4), 379–408 (2004)
Broadfoot, P., Lowe, G., Roscoe, B.: Automating Data Independence. In: Cuppens, F., Deswarte, Y., Gollmann, D., Waidner, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1895, pp. 175–190. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Brusó, M., Chatzikokolakis, K., den Hartog, J.: Formal verification of privacy for RFID systems. In: CSF 2010, pp. 75–88. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2010)
Burrows, M., Abadi, M., Needham, R.: A logic of authentication. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A 426(1871), 233–271 (1989)
Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In: FOCS 2001, pp. 136–145. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2001)
Canetti, R., Herzog, J.: Universally Composable Symbolic Analysis of Mutual Authentication and Key-Exchange Protocols. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 380–403. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Cervesato, I., Durgin, N., Lincoln, P., Mitchell, J., Scedrov, A.: A meta-notation for protocol analysis. In: CSFW 1999, pp. 55–69. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1999)
Chaki, S., Datta, A.: ASPIER: An automated framework for verifying security protocol implementations. In: CSF 2009, pp. 172–185. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)
Chen, L., Ryan, M.: Attack, Solution and Verification for Shared Authorisation Data in TCG TPM. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds.) FAST 2009. LNCS, vol. 5983, pp. 201–216. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Cheval, V., Comon-Lundh, H., Delaune, S.: Automating Security Analysis: Symbolic Equivalence of Constraint Systems. In: Giesl, J., Hähnle, R. (eds.) IJCAR 2010. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 6173, pp. 412–426. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Cheval, V., Comon-Lundh, H., Delaune, S.: Trace equivalence decision: Negative tests and non-determinism. In: CCS 2011, pp. 321–330. ACM, New York (2011)
Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: Deciding the Security of Protocols with Diffie-Hellman Exponentiation and Products in Exponents. In: Pandya, P.K., Radhakrishnan, J. (eds.) FSTTCS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2914, pp. 124–135. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR. In: LICS 2003, pp. 261–270. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2003)
Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR. Theoretical Computer Science 338(1-3), 247–274 (2005)
Chevalier, Y., Vigneron, L.: A tool for lazy verification of security protocols. In: ASE 2001, pp. 373–376. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2001)
Ciobâcă, Ş.: Automated Verification of Security Protocols with Appplications to Electronic Voting. Ph.D. thesis, ENS Cachan (2011)
Comon, H., Cortier, V.: Tree automata with one memory, set constraints and cryptographic protocols. Theoretical Computer Science 331(1), 143–214 (2005)
Comon-Lundh, H., Cortier, V.: New Decidability Results for Fragments of First-Order Logic and Application to Cryptographic Protocols. In: Nieuwenhuis, R. (ed.) RTA 2003. LNCS, vol. 2706, pp. 148–164. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Comon-Lundh, H., Cortier, V.: Security properties: two agents are sufficient. Science of Computer Programming 50(1-3), 51–71 (2004)
Comon-Lundh, H., Cortier, V.: Computational soundness of observational equivalence. In: CCS 2008, pp. 109–118. ACM, New York (2008)
Comon-Lundh, H., Shmatikov, V.: Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive or. In: LICS 2003, pp. 271–280. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2003)
Cortier, V., Delaune, S.: A method for proving observational equivalence. In: CSF 2009, pp. 266–276. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)
Cortier, V., Hördegen, H., Warinschi, B.: Explicit randomness is not necessary when modeling probabilistic encryption. In: Dima, C., Minea, M., Tiplea, F. (eds.) ICS 2006. ENTCS, vol. 186, pp. 49–65. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2006)
Cortier, V., Kremer, S., Küsters, R., Warinschi, B.: Computationally Sound Symbolic Secrecy in the Presence of Hash Functions. In: Arun-Kumar, S., Garg, N. (eds.) FSTTCS 2006. LNCS, vol. 4337, pp. 176–187. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Cortier, V., Kremer, S., Warinschi, B.: A survey of symbolic methods in computational analysis of cryptographic systems. Journal of Automated Reasoning 46(3-4), 225–259 (2011)
Cortier, V., Rusinowitch, M., Zălinescu, E.: Relating two standard notions of secrecy. Logical Methods in Computer Science 3(3) (2007)
Cortier, V., Warinschi, B.: Computationally Sound, Automated Proofs for Security Protocols. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 157–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Cortier, V., Warinschi, B.: A composable computational soundness notion. In: CCS 2011, pp. 63–74. ACM, New York (2011)
Cortier, V., Zălinescu, E.: Deciding Key Cycles for Security Protocols. In: Hermann, M., Voronkov, A. (eds.) LPAR 2006. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 4246, pp. 317–331. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Courant, J., Daubignard, M., Ene, C., Lafourcade, P., Lakhnech, Y.: Towards automated proofs for asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model. In: CCS 2008, pp. 371–380. ACM, New York (2008)
Courant, J., Daubignard, M., Ene, C., Lafourcade, P., Lakhnech, Y.: Automated Proofs for Asymmetric Encryption. In: Dams, D., Hannemann, U., Steffen, M. (eds.) de Roever Festschrift. LNCS, vol. 5930, pp. 300–321. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Courant, J., Ene, C., Lakhnech, Y.: Computationally Sound Typing for Non-interference: The Case of Deterministic Encryption. In: Arvind, V., Prasad, S. (eds.) FSTTCS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4855, pp. 364–375. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Cousot, P., Cousot, R.: Systematic design of program analysis frameworks. In: POPL 1979, pp. 269–282. ACM, New York (1979)
Cremers, C.J.F.: Scyther - Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols. Ph.D. thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology (2006)
Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J.C., Pavlovic, D.: A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols. Journal of Computer Security 13(3), 423–482 (2005)
Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J.C., Turuani, M.: Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Semantics for a Protocol Security Logic. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds.) ICALP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3580, pp. 16–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J.C., Warinschi, B.: Computationally sound compositional logic for key exchange protocols. In: CSFW 2006, pp. 321–334. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2006)
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D.: Symbolic Bisimulation for the Applied Pi Calculus. In: Arvind, V., Prasad, S. (eds.) FSTTCS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4855, pp. 133–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D.: Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols. Journal of Computer Security 17(4), 435–487 (2009)
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D., Steel, G.: Formal analysis of protocols based on TPM state registers. In: CSF 2011, pp. 66–82. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2011)
Denker, G., Meseguer, J., Talcott, C.: Protocol specification and analysis in Maude. In: FMSP 1998 (1998)
Denker, G., Millen, J.: CAPSL integrated protocol environment. In: DISCEX 2000, pp. 207–221. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2000)
Denning, D.E., Sacco, G.M.: Timestamps in key distribution protocols. Commun. ACM 24(8), 533–536 (1981)
Dierks, T., Rescorla, E.: RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.1 (2006), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346
Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-29(12), 198–208 (1983)
Dupressoir, F., Gordon, A.D., Jürjens, J., Naumann, D.A.: Guiding a general-purpose C verifier to prove cryptographic protocols. In: CSF 2011, pp. 3–17. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2011)
Durante, L., Sisto, R., Valenzano, A.: Automatic testing equivalence verification of spi calculus specifications. ACM TOSEM 12(2), 222–284 (2003)
Durgin, N.A., Lincoln, P.D., Mitchell, J.C., Scedrov, A.: Undecidability of bounded security protocols. In: FMSP 1999 (1999)
Durgin, N., Lincoln, P., Mitchell, J.C., Scedrov, A.: Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols. Journal of Computer Security 12(2), 247–311 (2004)
Durgin, N., Mitchell, J.C., Pavlovic, D.: A compositional logic for proving security properties of protocols. Journal of Computer Security 11(4), 677–721 (2003)
Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: A rewriting-based inference system for the NRL protocol analyzer and its meta-logical properties. Theoretical Computer Science 367(1-2), 162–202 (2006)
Fábrega, F.J.T., Herzog, J.C., Guttman, J.D.: Strand spaces: Proving security protocols correct. Journal of Computer Security 7(2/3), 191–230 (1999)
Feret, J.: Analysis of mobile systems by abstract interpretation. Ph.D. thesis, École Polytechnique (2005)
Fournet, C., Kohlweiss, M.: Modular cryptographic verification by typing. In: FCC 2011 (2011)
Galindo, D., Garcia, F.D., van Rossum, P.: Computational Soundness of Non-Malleable Commitments. In: Chen, L., Mu, Y., Susilo, W. (eds.) ISPEC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4991, pp. 361–376. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Genet, T., Klay, F.: Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification. In: McAllester, D. (ed.) CADE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1831, pp. 271–290. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Probabilistic encryption. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 28, 270–299 (1984)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rivest, R.: A digital signature scheme secure against adaptative chosen-message attacks. SIAM Journal of Computing 17(2), 281–308 (1988)
Gordon, A.D., Jeffrey, A.: Typing One-to-One and One-to-Many Correspondences in Security Protocols. In: Okada, M., Babu, C.S., Scedrov, A., Tokuda, H. (eds.) ISSS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2609, pp. 263–282. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Gordon, A., Jeffrey, A.: Authenticity by typing for security protocols. Journal of Computer Security 11(4), 451–521 (2003)
Gordon, A., Jeffrey, A.: Types and effects for asymmetric cryptographic protocols. Journal of Computer Security 12(3/4), 435–484 (2004)
Goubault-Larrecq, J.: A Method for Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Verification (Extended Abstract). In: Rolim, J.D.P. (ed.) IPDPS 2000 Workshops. LNCS, vol. 1800, pp. 977–984. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Goubault-Larrecq, J.: Deciding \({\cal H}_1\) by resolution. Information Processing Letters 95(3), 401–408 (2005)
Goubault-Larrecq, J., Parrennes, F.: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis on Real C Code. In: Cousot, R. (ed.) VMCAI 2005. LNCS, vol. 3385, pp. 363–379. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Halevi, S.: A plausible approach to computer-aided cryptographic proofs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/181 (2005), http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/181
Heather, J., Lowe, G., Schneider, S.: How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols. In: CSFW 2000, pp. 255–268. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2000)
Heather, J., Schneider, S.: A decision procedure for the existence of a rank function. Journal of Computer Security 13(2), 317–344 (2005)
Hüttel, H.: Deciding framed bisimilarity. In: INFINITY 2002, pp. 1–20 (2002)
Janvier, R., Lakhnech, Y., Mazaré, L.: Completing the Picture: Soundness of Formal Encryption in the Presence of Active Adversaries. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 172–185. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Janvier, R., Lakhnech, Y., Mazaré, L.: Relating the symbolic and computational models of security protocols using hashes. In: Degano, P., Küsters, R., Viganò, L., Zdancewic, S. (eds.) FCS-ARSPA 2006, pp. 67–89 (2006)
Jürjens, J.: Security analysis of crypto-based Java programs using automated theorem provers. In: ASE 2006, pp. 167–176. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2006)
Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D.: Analysis of an Electronic Voting Protocol in the Applied Pi Calculus. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 186–200. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: Reducing protocol analysis with XOR to the XOR-free case in the Horn theory based approach. In: CCS 2008, pp. 129–138. ACM, New York (2008)
Küsters, R., Truderung, T.: Using ProVerif to analyze protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. In: CSF 2009, pp. 157–171. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)
Laud, P.: Handling Encryption in an Analysis for Secure Information Flow. In: Degano, P. (ed.) ESOP 2003. LNCS, vol. 2618, pp. 159–173. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Laud, P.: Symmetric encryption in automatic analyses for confidentiality against active adversaries. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 71–85. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2004)
Laud, P.: Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library. In: CCS 2005, pp. 26–35. ACM, New York (2005)
Laud, P., Tšahhirov, I.: A User Interface for a Game-Based Protocol Verification Tool. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J. (eds.) FAST 2009. LNCS, vol. 5983, pp. 263–278. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Laud, P., Vene, V.: A Type System for Computationally Secure Information Flow. In: Liśkiewicz, M., Reischuk, R. (eds.) FCT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3623, pp. 365–377. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Liu, J., Lin, H.: A Complete Symbolic Bisimulation for Full Applied Pi Calculus. In: van Leeuwen, J., Muscholl, A., Peleg, D., Pokorný, J., Rumpe, B. (eds.) SOFSEM 2010. LNCS, vol. 5901, pp. 552–563. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Lowe, G.: Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds.) TACAS 1996. LNCS, vol. 1055, pp. 147–166. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Lowe, G.: A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In: CSFW 1997, pp. 31–43. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1997)
Lux, K.D., May, M.J., Bhattad, N.L., Gunter, C.A.: WSEmail: Secure internet messaging based on web services. In: ICWS 2005, pp. 75–82. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2005)
Meadows, C.A.: The NRL protocol analyzer: An overview. Journal of Logic Programming 26(2), 113–131 (1996)
Micciancio, D., Warinschi, B.: Soundness of Formal Encryption in the Presence of Active Adversaries. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 133–151. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Milicia, G.: χ-spaces: Programming security protocols. In: NWPT 2002 (2002)
Millen, J.: A necessarily parallel attack. In: FMSP 1999 (1999)
Millen, J., Shmatikov, V.: Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis. In: CCS 2001, pp. 166–175. ACM, New York (2001)
Millen, J.K.: The Interrogator model. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 251–260. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1995)
Millen, J.K., Clark, S.C., Freedman, S.B.: The Interrogator: Protocol security analysis. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering SE-13(2), 274–288 (1987)
Milner, R.: Communicating and mobile systems: the π-calculus. Cambridge University Press (1999)
Mitchell, J.C., Mitchell, M., Stern, U.: Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Murϕ. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 141–151. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1997)
Monniaux, D.: Abstracting cryptographic protocols with tree automata. Science of Computer Programming 47(2-3), 177–202 (2003)
Needham, R.M., Schroeder, M.D.: Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Commun. ACM 21(12), 993–999 (1978)
Nowak, D.: A Framework for Game-Based Security Proofs. In: Qing, S., Imai, H., Wang, G. (eds.) ICICS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4861, pp. 319–333. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Nowak, D.: On Formal Verification of Arithmetic-Based Cryptographic Primitives. In: Lee, P.J., Cheon, J.H. (eds.) ICISC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5461, pp. 368–382. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
O’Shea, N.: Using Elyjah to analyse Java implementations of cryptographic protocols. In: FCS-ARSPA-WITS 2008 (2008)
Paulson, L.C.: The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Computer Security 6(1-2), 85–128 (1998)
Pironti, A., Sisto, R.: Provably correct Java implementations of spi calculus security protocols specifications. Computers and Security 29(3), 302–314 (2010)
Poll, E., Schubert, A.: Verifying an implementation of SSH. In: WITS 2007 (2007)
Pozza, D., Sisto, R., Durante, L.: Spi2Java: Automatic cryptographic protocol Java code generation from spi calculus. In: AINA 2004, vol. 1, pp. 400–405. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2004)
Sarukkai, S., Suresh, S.P.: Tagging Makes Secrecy Decidable with Unbounded Nonces as Well. In: Pandya, P.K., Radhakrishnan, J. (eds.) FSTTCS 2003. LNCS, vol. 2914, pp. 363–374. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Roscoe, A.W., Broadfoot, P.J.: Proving security protocols with model checkers by data independence techniques. Journal of Computer Security 7(2, 3), 147–190 (1999)
Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: Protocol insecurity with finite number of sessions is NP-complete. Theoretical Computer Science 299(1-3), 451–475 (2003)
Shoup, V.: Sequences of games: a tool for taming complexity in security proofs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/332 (2004), http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/332
Smith, G., Alpízar, R.: Secure information flow with random assignment and encryption. In: FMSE 2006, pp. 33–43 (2006)
Song, D., Perrig, A., Phan, D.: AGVI - Automatic Generation, Verification, and Implementation of Security Protocols. In: Berry, G., Comon, H., Finkel, A. (eds.) CAV 2001. LNCS, vol. 2102, pp. 241–245. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Song, D.X., Berezin, S., Perrig, A.: Athena: a novel approach to efficient automatic security protocol analysis. Journal of Computer Security 9(1/2), 47–74 (2001)
Sprenger, C., Backes, M., Basin, D., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: Cryptographically sound theorem proving. In: CSFW 2006, pp. 153–166. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2006)
Swamy, N., Chen, J., Fournet, C., Strub, P.Y., Bharagavan, K., Yang, J.: Secure distributed programming with value-dependent types. In: Chakravarty, M.M.T., Hu, Z., Danvy, O. (eds.) ICFP 2011, pp. 266–278. ACM, New York (2011)
Tšahhirov, I., Laud, P.: Application of Dependency Graphs to Security Protocol Analysis. In: Barthe, G., Fournet, C. (eds.) TGC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4912, pp. 294–311. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Weidenbach, C.: Towards an Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols in First-Order Logic. In: Ganzinger, H. (ed.) CADE 1999. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 1632, pp. 314–328. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Woo, T.Y.C., Lam, S.S.: A semantic model for authentication protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 178–194. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1993)
Yao, A.C.: Theory and applications of trapdoor functions. In: FOCS 1982, pp. 80–91. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1982)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Blanchet, B. (2012). Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds) Principles of Security and Trust. POST 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7215. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-28640-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-28641-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)
