Towards Incrementalization of Holistic Hyperproperties

  • Dimiter Milushev
  • Dave Clarke
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7215)

Abstract

A hyperproperty is a set of sets of finite or infinite traces over some fixed alphabet and can be seen as a very generic system specification. In this work, we define the notions of holistic and incremental hyperproperties. Systems specified holistically tend to be more intuitive but difficult to reason about, whereas incremental specifications have a straightforward verification approach. Since most interesting security-related hyperproperties are in the syntactic class of holistic hyperproperties, we introduce the process of incrementalization to convert holistic specifications into incremental ones. We then present three incrementalizable classes of holistic hyperproperties and a respective verification method.

Keywords

Model Check Monotone Operator Security Policy Service Level Agreement Output Trace 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dimiter Milushev
    • 1
  • Dave Clarke
    • 1
  1. 1.IBBT-DistriNetKU LeuvenHeverleeBelgium

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