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International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust

POST 2012: Principles of Security and Trust pp 189–208Cite as

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Towards Unconditional Soundness: Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker

Towards Unconditional Soundness: Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker

  • Gergei Bana18 &
  • Hubert Comon-Lundh19 
  • Conference paper
  • 1306 Accesses

  • 19 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 7215)

Abstract

We consider the question of the adequacy of symbolic models versus computational models for the verification of security protocols. We neither try to include properties in the symbolic model that reflect the properties of the computational primitives nor add computational requirements that enforce the soundness of the symbolic model. We propose in this paper a different approach: everything is possible in the symbolic model, unless it contradicts a computational assumption. In this way, we obtain unconditional soundness almost by construction. And we do not need to assume the absence of dynamic corruption or the absence of key-cycles, which are examples of hypotheses that are always used in related works. We set the basic framework, for arbitrary cryptographic primitives and arbitrary protocols, however for trace security properties only.

Keywords

  • Encryption Scheme
  • Security Protocol
  • Security Property
  • Atomic Formula
  • Predicate Symbol

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Communication Science Laboratories, Atsugi, Kanagawa, Japan

    Gergei Bana

  2. CNRS, INRIA Project SecSi and LSV, ENS Cachan, France

    Hubert Comon-Lundh

Authors
  1. Gergei Bana
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  2. Hubert Comon-Lundh
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Pisa, Largo Bruno Pontecorvo, 3, 56127, Pisa, Italy

    Pierpaolo Degano

  2. Computer Science, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 100 Institute Road, 01609, Worcester, MA, USA

    Joshua D. Guttman

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bana, G., Comon-Lundh, H. (2012). Towards Unconditional Soundness: Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds) Principles of Security and Trust. POST 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7215. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_11

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