Nash Equilibrium in Weighted Concurrent Timed Games with Reachability Objectives
Timed automata  are a well accepted formalism in modelling real time systems. In this paper, we study concurrent games with two players on timed automata with costs attached to the locations and edges and try to answer the question of the existence of Nash Equilibrium (NE). Considering memoryless strategies, we show that with one clock it is decidable whether there exists a NE where player 1 has a cost bounded by a constant B, while with 3 clocks, it is not. The case of 2 clocks is an interesting open question.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Target Location Winning Strategy Edge Cost Time Automaton
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