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A Related-Key Attack on Block Ciphers with Weak Recurrent Key Schedules

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Book cover Foundations and Practice of Security (FPS 2011)

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Abstract

An important component of an iterated block cipher is the key schedule. In this paper, we consider iterated block ciphers with a key schedule algorithm described by a recurrence relation. We present an efficient related-key attack on those ciphers. With regard to similar techniques, such as the slide attack, our proposal considerably reduces the number of necessary plaintexts from O(2n/4) plaintexts to 2r, where r is the number of recovered round keys. The complexity of our attack is, moreover, almost equal to the complexity of guessing just one round key.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Moscow Engineering-Physics Institute, National Nuclear Research University, Moscow, Kashirskoe shosse 31, Russian Federation

    Marina Pudovkina

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  1. Marina Pudovkina
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. TELECOM-Bretagne, Campus de Rennes, 2, rue de la Châtaigneraie, 35512, Cesson Sévigné Cedex, France

    Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro

  2. Université Joseph Fourier, Laboratoire Verimag, Centre Equation, 2 avenue de Vignate, 38610, Gires, France

    Pascal Lafourcade

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Pudovkina, M. (2012). A Related-Key Attack on Block Ciphers with Weak Recurrent Key Schedules. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Lafourcade, P. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6888. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-27900-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-27901-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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