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A Related-Key Attack on Block Ciphers with Weak Recurrent Key Schedules

  • Marina Pudovkina
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6888)

Abstract

An important component of an iterated block cipher is the key schedule. In this paper, we consider iterated block ciphers with a key schedule algorithm described by a recurrence relation. We present an efficient related-key attack on those ciphers. With regard to similar techniques, such as the slide attack, our proposal considerably reduces the number of necessary plaintexts from O(2 n/4) plaintexts to 2r, where r is the number of recovered round keys. The complexity of our attack is, moreover, almost equal to the complexity of guessing just one round key.

Keywords

Block Cipher Encryption Function Round Function Plaintext Attack Boomerang Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marina Pudovkina
    • 1
  1. 1.Moscow Engineering-Physics InstituteNational Nuclear Research UniversityMoscowRussian Federation

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