Abstract
Recently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered [20], which is essentially based on copying other voter’s votes. To capture this and similar attacks, we extend the classical threat model and introduce a new security notion for voting protocols: Vote-Independence. We give a formal definition and analyze its relationship to established privacy properties such as Vote-Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. In particular we show that even Coercion-Resistant protocols do not necessarily ensure Vote-Independence.
This work was partially supported by the ANR project AVOTE. An extended version containing the detailed proofs is available as a technical report [9].
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Dreier, J., Lafourcade, P., Lakhnech, Y. (2012). Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Lafourcade, P. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6888. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_13
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