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Verifying Implementations of Security Protocols by Refinement

  • Nadia Polikarpova
  • Michał Moskal
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7152)

Abstract

We propose a technique for verifying high-level security properties of cryptographic protocol implementations based on stepwise refinement. Our refinement strategy supports reasoning about abstract protocol descriptions in the symbolic model of cryptography and gradually concretizing them towards executable code. We have implemented the technique within a general-purpose program verifier VCC and applied it to an extract from a draft reference implementation of Trusted Platform Module, written in C.

Keywords

Security Protocol Trust Platform Module Cryptographic Protocol Security Goal Private Area 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nadia Polikarpova
    • 1
  • Michał Moskal
    • 2
  1. 1.Chair of Software EngineeringETH ZurichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchRedmondUSA

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