The Postpositivist Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law

Grabowski, Andrzej

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0_8

Andrzej Grabowski²

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Abstract

This chapter presents a new (“postpositivist”) juristic conception of the validity of statutory law. In order to construct this concept, we adapt Peter Strawson’s model of conceptual analysis, based on the analysis of connections between concepts. The construction of the postpositivist concept of the validity of statutory law is preceded by the linguistic and logical analysis of the utterances concerning the validity of norms, formulated in the juristic language and based on Svein Eng’s theory of the “fused modality” of juristic expressions de lege lata. Then, following Strawson’s methodological guidelines, we identify the concepts that form the system of concepts related to the concept of the validity of statutory law. These are the semantic concept of legal norm (developed in the Poznań school of legal theory), the concept of legal situation, the pragmatic concept of legal norm and the conceptual distinction between Tun-Sollen/Dürfen and Sein-Sollen/Dürfen norms. The clarificative analysis results in a regulative definition that expresses the postpositivist conception of legal validity by means of the absence of legal options for refusing the fulfilment (implementation) of the statutory norm.

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Notes

1.
B. Wróblewski, Język prawny i prawniczy [Legal and Juristic Language], Kraków 1948.
2.
J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii wykładni prawa ludowego, op. cit., pp. 230ff. and ‘Legal Language and Legal Interpretation’, L&Ph 4 (1985), pp. 239–255; K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., pp. 39ff.
3.
J. Woleński, ‘Język prawny w świetle współczesnych metod analizy semantycznej’ [Legal Language in the Light of Modern Methods of Semantic Analysis], ZNUJ PP 31 (1967), pp. 141–156.
4.
Z. Ziembiński, ‘Le langage du droit et le langage juridique. Les critères de leur discernement’, APhD XIX (1974), pp. 25–31 and Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 81ff.
5.
T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Język prawny a język prawniczy’, op. cit., ‘Czy istnieje język prawny?’ [Does Legal Language Exist?], PiP 3 (1979), pp. 49–60, Język prawny z perspektywy socjolingwistycznej [Legal Language from Sociolinguistic Perspective], ZNUJ PNP 26 (1986), and ‘Język prawny a obraz świata’, op. cit.
6.
M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Rola pragmatyki w badaniach języka prawnego’ [The Role of Pragmatics in the Research on the Legal Language], AUL FI 6 (1981), pp. 41–57, Rozumienie ocen w języku prawnym [Understanding Evaluations in Legal Language], Łódź 1984, and ‘Language and Law’ in B. Lewaszkiewicz-Petrykowska (ed.), Rapports polonais, Łódź 1998, pp. 7–20.
7.
A. Bator, ‘O konserwatyźmie językowym nauki prawa’, op. cit. and ‘Język prawniczy wobec zmian w prawie’ [Juristic Language in the Face of Changes in Law], SP 1 (1991), pp. 3–16.
8.
J. Pieńkos, Podstawy juryslingwistyki. Język w prawie – Prawo w języku [The Fundamentals of Jurislinguistics. Language in Law – Law in Language], Warszawa 1999. Let us add that this study also presents a synthetic analysis of modern international literature that has been left aside in this work (pp. 36ff.).
9.
M. Zieliński, ‘Języki prawne i prawnicze’, op. cit. and ‘Język prawny, język administracyjny, język urzędowy’ [Legal Language, Language of Administration, Official Language] in E. Malinowska (ed.), Język – Prawo – Społeczeństwo, op. cit., pp. 9–18.
10.
The most interesting are the works of A. Choduń, ‘Język prawny a język potoczny’ [Legal Language and Ordinary Language] in E. Malinowska (ed.), Język – Prawo – Społeczeństwo, op. cit., pp. 77–86, ‘Leksyka tekstów aktów prawnych’ [The Lexis of the Texts of Legal Acts], RPEiS LXVIII/1 (2006), pp. 19–30, and Słownictwo tekstów aktów prawnych w zasobie leksykalnym współczesnej polszczyzny [The Vocabulary of the Texts of Legal Acts in the Contemporary Polish Lexical Resource], Warszawa 2007.
11.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 223–224 (the fragment on the second goal of clarification).
12.
For more see infra, at pp. 380ff. and 427ff.
13.
It means that for the purposes of the analysis, we will consider them as languages in the sense of la parole, rather than la langue. For more on the uselessness of linguistic analyses (in relation to norms) at the level of la langue see M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Legal Norm as a Pragmatic Category’, ARSP 65 (1979), pp. 206ff., in particular p. 213.
14.
See K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., pp. 69–71. Given the character of the style, the author of the fragment – discussed and quoted below – was most probably Wróblewski; nonetheless, we shall use the term “the conception of Opałek and Wróblewski”. The analysis to follow also takes into account the modifications of this conception, proposed by M. Zirk-Sadowski, Wprowadzenie do filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 217ff.
15.
It is worth noting at this point that our investigations will be limited to the classification and characterisation of the concept of the validity of statutory law, which we are now developing, thus leaving aside the typical jurisprudential concepts of legal validity, which we have analysed (and rejected) in the previous chapter.
16.
M. Zirk-Sadowski, Wprowadzenie do filozofii prawa, op. cit., p. 218.
17.
K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., p. 70.
18.
In this way, M. Zirk-Sadowski interprets this feature of “juristic textual concepts” in Wprowadzenie do filozofii prawa, op. cit., p. 218.
19.
The examples are provided by M. Zirk-Sadowski, ibidem, p. 219.
20.
K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., p. 70. Let us add a somewhat obvious comment that the role attributed to the juristic ordering concepts weighs strongly in favour of recognising the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law as an ordering concept, because we certainly try to elaborate a conception that would be useful in practice, rather than just meeting the cognitive objectives.
21.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 250–251.
22.
For more see Chap. 9 at pp. 470ff.
23.
Cf. Article 236 Section 2 and Article 238 Sections 1 and 3 of the Polish Constitution, which refer to “the validity of legal provisions” and “valid legal provisions”.
24.
Cf. Article 241 Section 7 of the Polish Constitution, which speaks of “valid bylaws”.
25.
This is the case probably because, as already demonstrated twenty years ago by J. Nowacki, in the texts of Polish legislative acts (and therefore in the legal language), the Polish lawmaker uses the concept of a legal provision or the names of systemising units of the legal texts (“article”, “paragraph”, “section” etc.), in principle, without using the concept of a legal norm – cf. idem, Przepis prawny a norma prawna, op. cit., pp. 31ff. Let us note that when using one of the most popular legal databases in Poland, containing the texts of current legislation, we will find only one act – at the statutory level – in which the legislator uses (four times) the concept of valid norms (more specifically, he uses the descriptive term “norms valid in the Member States of the European Union”) – see Article 11 Section 8, Article 15 Section 6, and Article 41 Section 2, Points 1 and 2 of the Ustawa z dnia 7 czerwca 2001 r. o leśnym materiale rozmnożeniowym [Statute of 7 June 2001 on forest reproductive material], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 2001, No. 73, Item 761, with amendments. However, only in relation to the first of the cited provisions under which: “The minister responsible for the environmental affairs shall determine, by means of a regulation, the organisational structure of the Bureau of Forestry Seed, taking into consideration the nature of the tasks defined in Article 10 and norms which are valid in this area in the Member States of the European Union”, can it be stated that the legislator does not use here a secondary meaning of the term “norm” – most commonly encountered in lawmaking acts (namely, a norm defined as a “pattern”, “measure”, “standard” etc.). For more on the secondary meaning of “norm” see M. Zieliński, Z. Ziembiński, Uzasadnianie twierdzeń, ocen i norm w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., p. 82 and J. Nowacki, ibidem, pp. 35ff., together with numerous examples of such secondary uses of this term in the law.
26.
For more see Chap. 6 at pp. 237–246.
27.
Cf. infra, pp. 390ff. and Chap. 9 at pp. 478ff.
28.
The legitimacy of categorising the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law as a juristic ordering concept is also supported by the comments made by J. Wróblewski, who stresses that the terminology of the theory of law “does not in principle use textual terms” – cf. idem, ‘Zagadnienia terminologii nauk prawnych’ [The Problems of the Terminology of Legal Sciences], NP XXXII/3 (1984), p. 82.
29.
K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., pp. 71ff. See also a modified version of this conception, elaborated by M. Zirk-Sadowski, Wprowadzenie do filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 220ff.
30.
It is worth noting that this is exactly the way in which the authors of the discussed conception carry out their conceptual analyses – cf. K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, ‘Sporne zagadnienia pojęć teoretycznoprawnych’ [Controversial Issues of Jurisprudential Concepts], RPEiS XXXIV/1 (1972), pp. 91–92.
31.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 355–357.
32.
Indeed, we are still left to discuss the definition corresponding to the normative concept of legal validity – see infra at pp. 413–422.
33.
K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa, op. cit., p. 75.
34.
We are very interested in the non-arbitrariness of clarificative analysis and its results because we treat the proposals of purely arbitrary definitions of the fundamental concepts of jurisprudence, one of which is undoubtedly the concept of legal validity, as useless in terms of implementing the primary cognitive function of legal theory; namely, the progress in our understanding of the law and legal practice. Arbitrariness, in fact, considerably limits the possibility of a rational discussion and substantive rather than just purely verbal polemics. In addition, it may be questionable whether there is a possibility of creating absolutely discretionary conventional concepts – cf. J. Kaczor, ‘Konwencjonalny charakter pojęć prawniczych’ [The Conventional Nature of Juristic Concepts], a report presented at the 16th National Congress of the Departments of Theory and Philosophy of Law “The Polish legal culture and the process of European integration” in Gniezno, 26–28 September 2004, typescript, pp. 2ff.
35.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 267–271.
36.
Cf. T. Pawłowski, Tworzenie pojęć w naukach humanistycznych, op. cit., pp. 29ff. Pawłowski discusses the etymological, inductive and intuitive method in reference to the construction of analytical definitions, emphasising that there are no methods of constructing regulative definitions. It is not yet excluded that these methods can be applied in a subsidiary way for the latter purpose.
37.
Cf. e.g., J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 44ff.
38.
See e.g., A. Stroll, Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 6ff., and the references cited therein.
39.
In our study, we have adopted the strategy of analysing only these methodological issues that serve to explain the grounds and procedures for the clarificative analysis.
40.
P.F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992, pp. 17ff.
41.
Ibidem, pp. 17–18.
42.
Ibidem, p. 19.
43.
Ibidem, pp. 18–20.
44.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 344–354.
45.
See Chap. 7, the argument A–VI at pp. 316–319 and the argument A–XII at pp. 338–339.
46.
It can hardly come as a surprise from a wider perspective on contemporary jurisprudential reflection, since – as evidenced by Peczenik – many reductionist theories of law, such as the economic analysis of law, the psychological theory of law developed by Petrażycki or the theories that reduce the rational legal reasoning to the rules of formal logic, despite achieving some valuable results, contemporarily no longer withstand the criticism, primarily because of their “imperialist” attempts to obtain an intellectual monopoly. Interestingly, Peczenik suggests – similarly to Strawson – a circular justification for our beliefs (knowledge), based on the idea of coherence. He writes: “Metaphorically speaking, a coherent belief system is like a network of argumentative circles, mostly quite large ones” – see idem, ‘Against Reductionism’, AS 2 (1998), pp. 101–103, 114ff. For more on the concept of coherence promoted by A. Peczenik see idem, ‘Coherence, Truth and Rightness in the Law’, op. cit., ‘Law, Morality, Coherence and Truth’, op. cit., ‘The Passion for Reason. Some Remarks on Coherence in the Law’ in E. Garzón Valdés et al. (eds.), Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory, op. cit., pp. 309–321, ‘Certainty or Coherence?’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), The Reasonable as Rational?, op. cit., pp. 157–171, and Scientia Juris, op. cit., pp. 115ff., 137ff.
47.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 247–248.
48.
It seems clear that, when carrying out the analyses, we must adopt a position similar to so-called semantic antirealism (which identifies the meaning of sentences with the conditions for their application or possibility of their being stated), since the use of the conception of so-called semantic realism (which identifies the meaning of sentences with the conditions of their truthfulness) would be tantamount to making the fallacy of begging the question. This fallacy would consist of the fact that we have not yet settled on whether the truth-values do apply to juristic utterances on the validity of norms (and more precisely, their propositional content, as expanded upon in a moment). Therefore, we cannot assume that it is the case. Generally, on realism and antirealism in the semantic sense see J. Woleński, Epistemologia [Epistemology], Vol. 3: Prawda i realizm [Truth and Realism], Kraków 2003, pp. 193–194, 196ff., and the references cited therein; whereas in relation to the analysis of juristic utterances see D. Patterson, Law and Truth, Oxford/New York 1996, pp. 5ff.
49.
This thesis was expressed by Wittgenstein in § 43 of Philosophical Investigations, op. cit., p. 20e, which is worth quoting in extenso (trans. G.E.M. Anscombe): “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning (Bedeutung) of a word is its use (Gebrauch) in the language (Sprache)”. Italics and quotation marks in the original.
50.
The fact that synonyms (semantically equivalent expressions) typically have identical conditions for their use in the language is irrelevant here, because it is one thing to talk about how to use the expression, and quite another to say that one expression has the same use as another. We will illustrate the latter through example because the presented thesis may seem unbelievable. If we tell someone that the English terms “French fry” and “chip” have the same linguistic usage, then what will she/he know about the situations in which these terms can be used in a way consistent with the semantic rules of English. This argument is borrowed from W.P. Alston, ‘Meaning and Use’ in G.H.R. Parkinson (ed.), The Theory of Meaning, Oxford 1968, pp. 159ff.
51.
This opinion was already formulated in 1985 by Z. Ziembiński, ‘Uwagi o negowaniu norm i wypowiedzi z normami związanych’, op. cit., p. 106. Naturally, during the last 20 years this state has undergone some changes, yet, unfortunately, for the worse, as evidenced by the next note.
52.
Let us look at some instructive examples drawn from the English literature. G.H. von Wright uses the terms “normative statement”, “norm-proposition” and “deontic sentence” (while we should add that “deontic sentence” may be of a descriptive or prescriptive character) – see e.g., idem, Norm and Action, op. cit., pp. 105ff. and ‘On Norms and Norm-Propositions. A Sketch’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), The Reasonable as Rational?, op. cit., p. 173. J.J. Moreso examines several categories of “legal propositions” such as “deontic legal statement”, “conceptual legal statement”, “pure legal statement”, “applicative legal statement” and “norm proposition” – see idem, Legal Indeterminacy and Constitutional Interpretation, op. cit., pp. 47 ff. and ‘On the Truth-conditions of Norm Propositions’, AS 6 (2002), pp. 63ff. A record in this field has probably been beaten by A. Aarnio, since in his studies we can read about: “norm statement”, “interpretive statement”, “norm proposition”, “norm contention”, “norm recommendation”, “interpretation proposition”, “meaning proposition” and “interpretive proposition” – see A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, ‘The Foundation of Legal Reasoning’, op. cit., pp. 425ff.; A. Aarnio, ‘On Truth and the Acceptability of Interpretative Propositions in Legal Dogmatics’, RT Bh. 2 (1981), pp. 44ff. and The Rational as Reasonable, op. cit., pp. 49ff. As for the history of the diverse terminology of the normative utterances and sentences about norms, derived from the distinction between “genuinely normative sentences” and “spuriously normative sentences”, made in 1941 by the Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius – see L. Lindahl, ‘Norms, Meaning Postulates, and Legal Predicates’, op. cit., pp. 293ff. (in particular, the scheme on p. 294, comparing the terminologies of I. Hedenius, A. Wedberg, H.L.A. Hart, G.H. von Wright, C.E. Alchourrón and E. Bulygin, as well as H. Kelsen); cf. T. Mazzarese, ‘“Norm Proposition”: Epistemic and Semantic Queries’, RT 22 (1991), pp. 39ff. Let us recall that the terminologies of Kelsen, Hart and Raz have been roughly discussed in Chap. 6 at pp. 230–234, although we did not consider there the problem of the logical value of the utterances about legal validity, which we are trying to explain now.
53.
We want to emphasise that by means of this distinction we do not try to multiply, but rather to reduce and simplify the current terminology. However, soon we will have to extend it, by adapting it to the needs of the analyses of the possible – lawmaking or non-lawmaking – solutions of validity discourse – cf. infra, pp. 380ff. and Chap. 9 at pp. 478–481.
54.
The attempt to establish some canonical form of positive and negative validity utterances seems inappropriate, given the diversity of the forms of utterances on validity that are made by lawyers. From the extensional perspective, the proposed distinction is to be understood in such a way that in positive validity utterances the predicate “is valid” is used in relation to the norms of statutory law, while in negative validity utterances we use the phrase “is not valid”.
55.
Within Polish legal theory, the essential features of the positivist model were identified and widely discussed in the studies of J. Wróblewski, ‘Paradygmat dogmatyki prawa a prawoznawstwo’ [A Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics and Jurisprudence] in S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński (eds.), Szkice z teorii prawa i szczegółowych nauk prawnych, op. cit., pp. 34ff.; Z. Pulka, Struktura poznania filozoficznego w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., pp. 45ff. and ‘Czy nastąpił zmierzch pozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa i prawoznawstwa?’, op. cit., pp. 148ff.; K. Płeszka, ‘O paradygmacie dogmatyki prawa’ [‘On the Paradigm of Legal Dogmatics] in J. Czapska et al. (eds.), Zasady procesu karnego wobec wyzwań współczesności, op. cit., pp. 763–773.
56.
See R. Guastini, ‘Interpretive Statements’ in E. Garzón Valdés et al. (eds.), Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory, op. cit., pp. 279–280.
57.
See J. Wróblewski, ‘Paradygmat dogmatyki prawa a prawoznawstwo’, op. cit., pp. 34–35 and Z. Pulka, ‘Czy nastąpił zmierzch pozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa i prawoznawstwa?’, op. cit., p. 151. Let us recall that the conception of an ontologically immanent source of the systemic character of law, according to which the legal system is allegedly only a product of the lawmaker’s actions, has already been criticized in Chap. 7 at pp. 282–284, where we opted for the transcendent origin of such a character.
58.
Let us indicate some of them. When analysing the legal dogmatists’ anxiety about whether the dimension of truth/falsehood applies to the statements of legal dogmatics, T. Gizbert-Studnicki suggests two reasons for such concerns. Firstly, an unjustified inferiority complex of legal scholars and the representatives of other humanistic sciences towards natural sciences, is based on the naive belief that the latter provide an objective and certain knowledge. Secondly, there is the conviction of the auxiliary function of legal dogmatics in relation to the practice of law. In order for this role to be fulfilled, it is necessary that dogmatic statements about the legal system are true. Otherwise, it is doubtful whether the practice of the judicial application of law, partly based on those statements, can reach certain values and objectivities, essential for this practice. See T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘How Many Theories of Truth Are Needed in Jurisprudence?’, ARSP Bh. 25 (1985), p. 153. R. Guastini underlines the fallacy of the assumptions of the positivist, cognitive theory of legal interpretation, that consists in accepting that the words have the “proper” intrinsic meaning, depending on the objective relationship between words and things (objects), that lawmakers (being usually a collegial organ) have an univocal and recognisable “will” or “intention” and that the legal system must be complete and consistent – see idem, ‘Interpretive Statements’, op. cit., p. 280. Finally, let us add that the view according to which statements about the validity of norms have logical value is indirectly supported by deontic logicians, who have, for a long time, assumed, without any evidence (because the logic – as an axiomatic and non-empirical science – certainly cannot provide such evidence), that the so-called norm propositions (which are descriptive deontic propositions) are the propositions in a logical sense even if they refer to the legal norms, and not just to very simple examples of imaginary norms, usually analysed by logicians – see e.g., G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, op. cit., pp. 105–106 and ‘On Norms and Norm-Propositions’, op. cit., p. 173; E. Bulygin, ‘On Norm Propositions’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), The Reasonable as Rational?, op. cit., pp. 129–130. The view that the juristic validity utterances do have truth-values is also supported by the belief – entrenched in the legal reasoning, yet not based on any evidence – that juristic statements de lege lata are purely descriptive, therefore they possess a logical value due to the sufficient reason that they differ from utterances de lege ferenda, which have a normative character, and thus are deprived of such value – for more see e.g., A. Peczenik, Scientia Juris, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
59.
A. Aarnio, ‘On Truth and the Acceptability of Interpretative Propositions in Legal Dogmatics’, op. cit, pp. 46–47, 51. For more on Aarnio’s concept of acceptability see infra, note 125 at p. 384.
60.
Z. Ziembiński, ‘Prescriptive and/or Descriptive Language in Legal Sciences’, op. cit, p. 92.
61.
J. Wróblewski, ‘Obowiązywanie systemowe i granice dogmatycznego podejścia do systemu prawa’, op. cit., p. 35. Cf. idem, ‘Problems Related to the One Right Answer Thesis’, RJ 2 (1989), pp. 243ff.
62.
See J. Wróblewski, ‘Nieostrość systemu prawa’, op. cit., pp. 19ff. and A. Peczenik, J. Wróblewski, ‘Fuzziness and Transformations: Towards Explaining Legal Reasoning’, op. cit., pp. 26ff. Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 277–278.
63.
J. Wróblewski, ‘Paradygmat dogmatyki prawa a prawoznawstwo’, op. cit., p. 39.
64.
J. Wróblewski, ‘Semantics and Pragmatics of Normative Qualification Statements’, op. cit., p. 41. Yet, it should be kept in mind that the statements on legal validity, based on the factual concept of legal validity, are never absolutely certain, as they are always highly relative, as stressed by one of the creators of this conception – A. Ross, On Law and Justice, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
65.
See T. Mazzarese, ‘“Norm Proposition”: Epistemic and Semantic Queries’, op. cit., pp. 42ff.
66.
See S. Eng, Analysis of Dis/agreement – with particular reference to Law and Legal Theory, Dordrecht 2003 [the first Norwegian edition in 1998, based on his doctoral thesis of 1996] and ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of “Descriptive Proposition” and “Normative Proposition” as Concepts of Degree’, RJ 13 (2000), pp. 236–260.
67.
Thus, her deliberations refer directly to those validity utterances that we have identified above as positive ones.
68.
See T. Mazzarese, ‘“Norm Proposition”: Epistemic and Semantic Queries’, op. cit., pp. 40, 42ff.
69.
Mazzarese does not define “norm formulation” and this term is not often used in jurisprudential studies. Therefore, it has to be explained that “norm formulation” usually stands for the wording of a normative utterance, which is then subjected to legal interpretation. Mazzarese writes, for example, that it is hard to defend the standpoint that a norm formulation expresses only one norm. Moreover, she rightly states that one single norm can have different norm formulations. Yet, it is not always the case because, according to the author, the concept of norm formulation also applies to unwritten norms (such as the norms of customary law) and, more importantly, a norm formulation may be the outcome of legal interpretation (as in the case of the norms of judge-made law, interpreted from the content of judicial precedents). Let us add that Mazzarese most likely uses the term “norm formulation” in a way quite similar to G.H. von Wright, who defined this term in Norm and Action, op. cit., p. 93, as “the sign or symbol (the words) used in enunciating (formulating) the norm”.
70.
Mazzarese has here in mind Erik Stenius and Georg Henrik von Wright, who (independently of each other and in reference to Ingemar Hedenius’s distinction, which was mentioned supra, note 52 at p. 369) have introduced this term to the conceptual apparatus of deontic logic in 1963 – see T. Mazzarese, ‘“Norm Proposition”: Epistemic and Semantic Queries’, op. cit., pp. 42–44, in particular, notes 11 and 17, and the works of Stenius and von Wright indicated therein.
71.
T. Mazzarese, ibidem, pp. 41, 47ff. In the context of our analysis, the assumption which proves to be most important among these “problematic presuppositions” and “debatable theses” is the one under which norm propositions have truth-values. This problem will be further discussed in more detail.
72.
Ibidem, pp. 48ff.
73.
Ibidem, pp. 48–49.
74.
Ibidem, pp. 56ff.
75.
Ibidem, pp. 58–59.
76.
See e.g., I. Niiniluoto, ‘Norm Propositions Defended’, RJ 4 (1991), pp. 367–373 and E. Bulygin, ‘On Norm Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 130ff.
77.
Pulka, like Mazzarese, comes to the conclusion that dogmatic deontic propositions (understood descriptively – as describing the language of legal acts, or a set of postulated worlds, designated by the legal texts) strongly presuppose (in the semantic sense) the propositions formed by combining two types of dogmatic statements; namely, validity and interpretive ones. Pulka believes that these statements are neither empirically determinable (as regards their truth-value) nor axiologically neutral, because their premises of validity are axiological and normative reasons, related to the adopted criteria of validity and to the directives of legal interpretation, which are often evaluative in nature. Pulka, nonetheless, does not go as far as Mazzarese, because he assumes that the dimension of truth/falsity can be applied to dogmatic deontic propositions. However, their truth is of an analytical nature and cannot be understood in a classic way, but at most, in the spirit of the consensual theory of truth – see Z. Pulka, Struktura poznania filozoficznego w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., pp. 46–51 and ‘Czy nastąpił zmierzch pozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa i prawoznawstwa?’, op. cit., pp. 160ff., 174–176.
78.
Bulygin claims that there is no reason to believe (as adopted by Mazzarese) that norm propositions must concern valid norms because they may well refer, for example, to the norms contained in the draft of a statute, which are invalid – see E. Bulygin, ‘On Norm Propositions’, op. cit., p. 132. It is a question of terminology, worthy of noting, but irrelevant to the undertaken analysis of juristic validity utterances.
79.
In presenting Eng’s theory, I rely on his own summary provided in ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions’, op. cit. For more see idem, Analysis of Dis/agreement – with particular reference to Law and Legal Theory, op. cit., pp. 312ff. A synthetic description of Eng’s theory can be found in A. Peczenik, ‘Legal Research – Normative and Descriptive’, AIC XXIX-XXX (1996–1997), pp. 20–21 and Scientia Juris, op. cit., pp. 100–101; see also U.U. Bindreiter, ‘“Descriptive Normativity”: Kelsen’s Sollsatz in the Light of Some Later Theories’, op. cit., pp. 84–90.
80.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, we have to clarify one terminological issue. The term “normative proposition” is often used by the authors who analyse the utterances about norms (e.g., C.E. Alchourrón and E. Bulygin, R. Guastini, P.E. Navarro, G.H. von Wright) as a synonym for “norm proposition”. Yet, it is very misleading, because when understood in such a way, the term “normative proposition” stands – at least according to the indicated authors – for descriptive propositions about norms (i.e., propositions about their existence, content, validity etc.), as pointed out by L. Lindahl, ‘Norms, Meaning Postulates, and Legal Predicates’, op. cit., note 1 on p. 293. Eng uses this term in a different way and – in my opinion – an accurate manner. Namely, a term “normative proposition” stands for non-descriptive propositions (directives, evaluations etc.) concerning human conduct and is devoid of truth-values. It is how we also use this concept in our analyses, incidentally, in accordance with the understanding of the term “normative proposition” that is usually adopted in the Polish jurisprudential and semiotic works.
81.
S. Eng, ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 236, 251.
82.
Ibidem, pp. 236, 239ff.
83.
Ibidem, p. 252.
84.
Cf. e.g., J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, Methods of Legal Reasoning, op. cit., pp. 125ff.
85.
S. Eng, ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 239ff.
86.
Ibidem, pp. 237 and 240.
87.
Eng stresses that his theory is not about the objective linguistic meaning, which nevertheless does not seem to diminish the value of his theory, if we consider the controversies over the objective meaning of sentences. In the context of analysing jurisprudential statements it is worth noting that, as shown by T. Gizbert-Studnicki, even the assumption that the meaning of legal texts is (in some sense) objective, does not provide any objective foundation for dogmatic interpretive propositions – see idem, ‘How Many Theories of Truth Are Needed in Jurisprudence?’, op. cit., pp. 158ff. Although the analysis of Gizbert-Studnicki is referred to dogmatic interpretive propositions, his conclusions can be extended to validity utterances that are at the core of our interests, as justified by the views of J. Wróblewski, T. Mazzarese and Z. Pulka, which have been analysed above.
88.
S. Eng, ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions’, op. cit., p. 238. Those who are familiar with the conceptual apparatus of the theory of speech acts can easily see that at this point Eng’s considerations show a far-reaching similarity with the standard pragmatic analyses of the so-called directions of fit of assertions, which have word-to-world direction of fit [↓] and directives, which have an opposite, i.e. world-to-word direction of fit [↑] – for more see J.R. Searle, ‘A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts’ in K. Gunderson, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, MSPhS VII (1975), pp. 346–347 and J.R. Searle, D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, op. cit., pp. 52ff., 92ff.
89.
S. Eng, ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions’, op. cit., p. 246.
90.
Ibidem, pp. 246ff.
91.
Ibidem, p. 238.
92.
Ibidem, pp. 241ff.
93.
Ibidem, pp. 250ff. According to Eng, it is “a fundamental consciousness perspective” of the lawyers who loyally take into account the opinion of other lawyers and law practitioners. What constitutes an important element of this perspective is a specific legal method, expressed in the argumentation made in juristic language, based on specialised knowledge on law application and on the views expressed by other lawyers.
94.
Ibidem, pp. 244ff.
95.
Ibidem, pp. 256ff.
96.
Cf. supra, note 52 at p. 369.
97.
A. Peczenik, Scientia Juris, op. cit., p. 101.
98.
For more on Kelsen’s concepts of “Sollsatz” and “Rechtssatz” see Chap. 6, note 65 at p. 230.
99.
U.U. Bindreiter, ‘“Descriptive Normativity”: Kelsen’s Sollsatz in the Light of Some Later Theories’, op. cit., pp. 90ff.
100.
See Ch. Dahlman, ‘Fused Modality or Confused Modality?’, RJ 17 (2004), pp. 80–86 and S. Eng, ‘Fused Modality. An Integral Part of Lawyers’ Form of Life’, RJ 18 (2005), pp. 429–433.
101.
Ch. Dahlman, ibidem, pp. 82ff.
102.
Ibidem, pp. 85–86.
103.
S. Eng, ‘Fused Modality. An Integral Part of Lawyers’ Form of Life’, op. cit., pp. 429ff.
104.
Ibidem, pp. 431ff.
105.
Ibidem, pp. 430, 432.
106.
Ibidem, p. 432.
107.
It can be interpreted in such a way that Mazzarese’s conception does not undermine the very distinction, but its application in relation to juristic utterances concerning valid law.
108.
Cf. S. Eng, ‘Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 241, 251–252.
109.
We therefore do not make a fallacy of petitio principii which can be, as I believe, legitimately imputed to the traditional theory. Adopting the traditional distinction of juristic utterances into two categories, namely purely descriptive and purely normative ones, in principle determines the result of the characteristics of juristic validity utterances because – as we shall prove in the next section – the purely normative statements about the validity of norms are utterly redundant both from the legal point of view as well as from the pragmatic perspective of linguistic communication.
110.
Cf. supra, pp. 360–361.
111.
In logical literature, this error is named fallacia fictae universalitatis.
112.
E. Bulygin, ‘On Norm Propositions’, op. cit., p. 132. The correctness of this statement does not naturally determine that Mazzarese actually made such an error. For more on the controversy between Mazzarese and Bulygin see R. Guastini, ‘Eugenio Bulygin e Tecla Mazzarese su interpretazione e proposizioni normative’, D&QP 6 (2006), pp. 97–100.
113.
E. Bulygin, ‘On Norm Propositions’, op. cit., p. 134. Let us note that if we even leave the logical objection aside, then Bulygin’s thesis also raises substantive doubts – see P.E. Navarro, ‘Enunciados jurídicos y proposiciones normativas’, op. cit., pp. 152ff.
114.
See L. Morawski, ‘Zasady prawne – komentarz krytyczny’, op. cit., p. 81, and the references cited therein.
115.
Philosophical literature on the concept of truth is too vast to present it here, yet it merits indicating two very interesting jurisprudential monographs devoted to the issue of truth in law and in legal discourse – D. Patterson, Law and Truth, op. cit. and U. Neumann, Wahrheit im Recht, op. cit.
116.
Let us add that by “standard theory of speech acts” we refer to the J.R. Searle’s theory of speech acts, being the extension of J.L. Austin’s original conceptions of performatives and illocutionary acts.
117.
J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, op. cit., p. 145.
118.
The term “deontic proposition” is derived from Greek – τò δέον means “what is to be” or “what ought to be”. Both usages are, therefore, semantically acceptable. For more see e.g., J. Kalinowski, ‘Logika prawnicza a logika deontyczna’ [Legal Logic and Deontic Logic] in S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński (eds.), Szkice z teorii prawa i szczegółowych nauk prawnych, op. cit., pp. 347ff. and ‘Ontic and Deontic’, IJSL III/8 (1990), p. 136.
119.
See e.g., E. Bulygin, ‘On Norm Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 129–130; G.H. von Wright, ‘Deontic Logic: A Personal View’, op. cit., p. 31 and ‘On Norms and Norm-Propositions’, op. cit., p. 173.
120.
W.P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth, Ithaca 1996, pp. 5ff., 22ff.
121.
Ibidem, p. 5.
122.
Ibidem, p. 7. Italics in the original.
123.
For more on the ways of understanding the objectivity in legal and juristic discourse see T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Podstawy argumentacji prawniczej’, op. cit., p. 36 ff.
124.
W.P. Alston, A Realist Conception of Truth, op. cit., p. 7.
125.
A. Aarnio has been the most consistent advocate of the consensual theory of truth, based on the concept of acceptability – see idem, ‘On Truth and the Acceptability of Interpretative Propositions in Legal Dogmatics’, op. cit., pp. 46 ff., ‘On the Validity, Efficacy and Acceptability of Legal Norms’, op. cit., pp. 160ff., and The Rational as Reasonable, op. cit., p. 188 ff. In Polish literature, following Aarnio, the consensual theory of truth in relation to juristic interpretive propositions has been adopted by T. Gizbert-Studnicki, who nevertheless also recognises the need to use the correspondence theory of truth in jurisprudence – see idem, ‘How Many Theories of Truth Are Needed in Jurisprudence?’, op. cit., in particular pp. 160–161. It should be noted that in the context of our analyses, the idea of applying the consensual theory of truth in the form proposed by the Finnish philosopher to the characteristics of validity utterances is out of question because it constitutes a version of the conception of the axiological legal validity of J. Wróblewski, which Aarnio explicitly acknowledges – cf. idem, ‘On the Validity, Efficacy and Acceptability of Legal Norms’, op. cit., p. 154 and The Rational as Reasonable, op. cit., p. 33. The application of this theory would thus be inconsistent with a detached and axiologically impartial methodological approach to the jurisprudential clarification of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law as adopted in this study – cf. Chap. 6, pp. 234–237. Let us add that even the fact of applying the consensual theory of truth within the area of jurisprudence is controversial in itself. For example, J. Wróblewski challenges the manner of understanding dogmatic utterances as utterances about the views of the juristic audience rather than as utterances about law – see idem, ‘Paradygmat dogmatyki prawa a prawoznawstwo’, op. cit., pp. 41–42. In turn, U. Neumann, in the context of the consensual theory of truth in the German theory of practical discourse, formulates the objection concerning the relationship between the concepts of truth and consensus. He raises the question as to which of these concepts is the “active part” and which the “passive” one. Neumann believes that it is not clear whether the statement is true because of its “ability” to achieve consensus, or – conversely – if it is “capable” of reaching consensus because it is true – see idem, Wahrheit im Recht, op. cit., p. 25. Similar argumentation has been presented by J.J. Moreso, who questions the usefulness of the consensual theory of truth in relation to the problem of norm existence, emphasising that the consent of a certain legal community as to the existence of the norm can only be a symptom but not the criterion of its existence – see idem, ‘On the Truth-conditions of Norm Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 65ff.
126.
One can, in fact, support the idea, widely adopted among logicians, that the truth-value is the property which is also attributed to such propositions in relation to which we do not have any effective method allowing for us to determine their logical value; it is sufficient that they describe reality. Let us note that in our analyses we adopted the standpoint expressed by lawyers rather than by logicians, because this study is addressed to the former (which, contrary to appearances, seems to us a quite reasonable argument). It is also worth noting that the standpoint on the extension of the utterances (propositions) having logical value, which we attribute to lawyers, largely resembles anti-metaphysical views formulated, for example, by the representatives of Wiener Kreis, concerning the necessity of “susceptibility to the verification” of the scientific judgments and theories.
127.
A. Aarnio, R. Alexy, A. Peczenik, ‘The Foundation of Legal Reasoning’, op. cit., p. 427.
128.
Kodeks cywilny. Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. [Civil Code. Statute of 23 April 1964], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 964, No. 16, Item 93, with amendments.
129.
For more see Chap. 6, pp. 245–246. Let us recall that a legal norm is defined as “an utterance which sufficiently unambiguously orders (or prohibits) someone (the addressee) certain behaviour in certain circumstances”.
130.
See e.g., G. Bieniek, H. Ciepła, S. Dmowski, J. Gudowski, K. Kołakowski, M. Zychowicz, T. Wiśniewski, C. Żuławska, Komentarz do kodeksu cywilnego. Księga trzecia: Zobowiązania [Commentary to the Civil Code. Book Three: Obligations], 3rd ed., Warszawa 2001, where the explanatory notes on the interpretation of Article 415 of Polish Civil Code take up 16 pages (pp. 216–233).
131.
We apply here the concept of presupposition in the sense referring to the views of Frege and Strawson, rather than Russell. Moreover, we have in mind the so-called strong presupposition (“resistant to negation”); namely, that it is identical for a positive and negative utterance about the validity of norms – for more see R. Sarkowicz, Poziomowa interpretacja tekstu prawnego, op. cit., pp. 133 ff., and the references cited therein.
132.
For more on declarations see J.R. Searle, ‘A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts’, op. cit., pp. 358ff. and ‘How Performatives Work’, Lin&Ph 12 (1989), pp. 540ff.; J.R. Searle, D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, op. cit., pp. 56ff., 95ff. Cf. A. Grabowski, Judicial Argumentation and Pragmatics, op. cit., pp. 83ff., and the references cited therein. It should be added that in the following analysis, we deliberately avoid the use of not very well-known conceptual network of speech acts theory and we try to express the pragmatic analysis in a terminologically simplified form.
133.
For the purposes of the undertaken pragmatic analysis, we shall assume that in the system-type of statutory law the constitutional courts rule and present the standpoint on the validity of norms and not of legal provisions. Such assumption seems acceptable, because even if the constitutional court directly refers in its ruling to the validity of legal provisions, its utterances – at least indirectly – undoubtedly concern the validity of legal norms.
134.
If we deal with the conceptual network of Searle’s speech acts theory, one needs to consider whether the positive validity utterances of the constitutional courts belong to the category of extra-linguistic declarations, which – by definition – result in the truth of their propositional content, which would, in turn, entail the necessity of the truth of jurisprudential utterances that have the identical content. For more about this category of speech acts see the works indicated in note 132 above. It should be added that in our analysis we use the findings made in these works, thus knowingly leaving aside the question of the logical value of performatives and the methods of their conceptual recognition (e.g., in terms of analytic, self-confirming, non-falsifying or self-descriptive propositions) – for more on this see e.g., L. Åqvist, ‘Some Remarks on Performatives in the Law’, AI&L 11 (2003), pp. 110ff. and W. Patryas, Performatywy w prawie [Performatives in Law], Poznań 2005, pp. 61ff., and the references cited therein.
135.
Kelsen probably first used this distinction in his famous lecture in Vienna in April 1928, entitled ‘Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit’, VVDS 5 (1929), pp. 30–88, where, on p. 56, we find the terms “der positive Gesetzgeber” and “der negative Gesetzgeber”. From the jurisprudential perspective, for more on Kelsen’s theory on the “negative” legislator and its shortcomings see S. Wronkowska, ‘Kilka uwag o “prawodawcy negatywnym”’ [Some Comments on the “Negative Legislator”], PiP 10 (2008), pp. 5ff.
136.
The view about the declarative nature of such a ruling results from approving the theory of a “negative” legislator. We use here the concepts of declaratory and constitutive rulings according to the manner adopted in the Polish dogmatics of the constitutional law – the former rulings do not change the valid law, while the latter do so. At this point it is worth noting the critical remarks on the distinction between these concepts, formulated from the jurisprudential perspective by S. Kaźmierczyk, ‘Orzeczenia konstytutywne i deklaratywne’ [Constitutive and Declaratory Rulings] AUW 211 (1973), pp. 25–38 and ‘Charakter prawny orzeczeń Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [The Legal Nature of the Constitutional Court Rulings], AUW 1037 (1987), pp. 271–294.
137.
Let us recall that a confirming ruling of the constitutional court can hardly be considered as a condition of the systemic validity of norms – cf. Chap. 7, note 197 at p. 291.
138.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 290–291.
139.
It should be added that in this case, due to purely conceptual reasons, it is difficult to speak of a “mistake” by the constitutional court, because we are dealing here with lawmaking and not with the examination of its compliance with the constitution. In turn, when lawyers talk about “judicial mistakes”, they do not refer to a “legislative mistake” as that means something else – for example, an instrumentally incorrect choice of the method of legal regulation by the legislator or a serious violation of the rules in terms of legislative technique.
140.
We mean here a famous provision, yet rarely used in practice; namely, Article 1 Section 2 of the Swiss Civil Code, under which – in the absence of applicable legal regulation – the court should rule on the basis of customary law, and in the absence of such law, it should rule “selon les règles qu’il établirait s’il avait à faire acte de législateur” – the quotation after H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., p. 147. It should be added that in our analyses we deliberately ignore the fundamental controversy regarding the lawmaking activity of courts in the continental system-type of statutory law. On this question, it is worth indicating an important standpoint of the leading representative of hard legal positivism – E. Bulygin – who presented his affirmative answer in ‘Los jueces, ¿crean derecho?’, IS 18 (2003), pp. 7–25. I think that today’s lawmaking activity of the courts is the fact; therefore, the principle of the separation of powers can be regarded as an ideological mystification, unfortunately, often supported by legal doctrine. Yet, this is already a topic for another study. In this context, from the recent Polish literature see e.g., A. Gomułowicz, Aspekt prawotwórczy sądownictwa administracyjnego [Legislative Aspect of the Administrative Jurisdiction], Warszawa 2008, in particular pp. 91ff.
141.
Let us note that the results of the undertaken analysis can be mutatis mutandis referred to the positive validity utterances that are made by the courts of general jurisdiction or by administrative courts, in relation to which one can also argue whether they are of a purely confirming character or – at least sometimes – lawmaking one. It should be also pointed out that although judges and other law enforcing entities tend to be bound by the content of the constitutional court rulings, this fact does not bear any consequences as to the linguistic character or the logical value of the utterances about validity – this binding force is of a normative and institutional character rather than of a cognitive one. It would be absurd to assume that the judges, due to the fact of being bound by the content of the constitutional court rulings, undertake merely true, purely descriptive statements about the validity of legal norms.
142.
Naturally, we do not question that the jurisprudential utterances concerning the content of the constitutional court rulings have descriptive and truth-oriented character. We only claim that this fact does not determine the linguistic and logical nature of the juristic (in particular: dogmatic) positive validity utterances which refer to the confirming or “positive” lawmaking decisions of the constitutional courts.
143.
On the concept of tribunal derogation (performed by a constitutional court) and its differences to the so-called authentic derogation (carried out by the legislator) see Chap. 9, pp. 479–480, and the references cited therein.
144.
According to the institutional (formal) classification of speech acts, derived from the Searlean taxonomy of speech acts, the utterances of the constitutional courts that derogate legal norms belong to the category of “extra-linguistic declarations”.
145.
One can only metaphorically say that the fact of the loss of validity can be “questioned” by the legislator, but in order to do that, a new legal norm, identical in its content to the one derogated by the constitutional court, needs to be enacted by him. Nevertheless, it cannot come as a surprise that in the case in which the legislator undertakes such extraordinary steps to evade the consequences of the “tribunal derogation” carried out by the constitutional court, the negative jurisprudential utterances concerning the previously derogated norm cease to be true – because there will indeed be a change of the “truth maker”; namely, the positive law, which always outdates the part of juristic utterances that refer to the previous law regulations.
146.
The fact that they are “true by definition” due to their fully performative character is not in contradiction with the statement that their propositional content, as well as the semantically identical propositional content of the secondary negative jurisprudential validity utterances is also true in the sense of Alston’s realistic conception of truth that we apply in this study.
147.
Cf. supra, pp. 371–380.
148.
Cf. O. Weinberger, ‘Wartość, wartościowanie i doświadczanie wartości w argumentacji prawniczej’, op. cit., pp. 264, 277ff. and ‘Wertediskurs in Moral, Recht und Politik’, op. cit.
149.
K. Płeszka, ‘O paradygmacie dogmatyki prawa’, op. cit., p. 771. A similar opinion was formulated by J. Wróblewski when he wrote about going beyond the traditional paradigm of jurisprudential deliberations – see K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Prawo. Metodologia, filozofia, teoria prawa, op. cit., pp. 38ff. Cf. the criticism of the traditional paradigm of legal dogmatics presented by Z. Pulka, ‘Czy nastąpił zmierzch pozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa i prawoznawstwa?’, op. cit., pp. 160ff.
150.
My comments are based on the reconstruction of the standpoint expressed by these authors, provided by V. Villa, ‘Legal Theory and Value Judgments’, op. cit., pp. 460ff. In this context, it is worth to familiarise with Villa’s interesting argumentation in favour of the necessity of value judgments in jurisprudence – see ibidem, pp. 472ff.
151.
Cf. Chap. 4, pp. 126–130 and Chap. 5, pp. 209–212.
152.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 228–237. Let us recall that the other categories of juristic utterances either express the acceptance for the law (the committed statements) or they can express such approval (the detached statements in Raz’s sense, adopted in our analyses, and the internal statements in Hart’s sense).
153.
Cf. supra, pp. 371–372 and Chap. 7, pp. 277–279.
154.
It is symptomatic that legal positivists tend to excessively use metaphors when they struggle with the non-conclusiveness of the solutions to validity problems that they themselves suggest, yet we must admit that they usually try to explain these metaphors in analytic terms.
155.
The presented argument is valid providing that we approve the specific juristic understanding of the truth of juristic validity utterances – cf. supra, note 126 at p. 385, with the corresponding text, referring to the analyses of J. Wróblewski and T. Mazzarese. For if we indeed assume a broader (i.e., logical) understanding of truth, then the fact that we cannot determine the logical value of some juristic utterance (more precisely, of its propositional content) about legal validity does not entail that it does not have the truth-value.
156.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 241–242 and Chap. 7, note 130 at p. 277.
157.
N. MacCormick, ‘Argumentation and Interpretation in Law’, op. cit., p. 29.
158.
L. Morawski, ‘Kilka uwag na temat wykładni’ [Some Comments on Interpretation’] in S. Wronkowska (ed.), Polska kultura prawna a proces integracji europejskiej, op. cit., p. 41.
159.
R. Sarkowicz, ‘Uwagi o współczesnej interpretacji prawniczej’ [Comments on the Modern Legal Interpretation] in S. Wronkowska (ed.), Polska kultura prawna a proces integracji europejskiej, op. cit., p. 28. A similar standpoint – already in relation to legal interpretation – has been expressed by E. Bulygin, ‘On Norm Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 130–131 and R. Guastini, ‘Interpretive Statements’, op. cit., pp. 280ff.
160.
We refer here to the recent controversy between L. Morawski and T. Gizbert-Studnicki, concerning the theory of interpretation assumed by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal – cf. R. Sarkowicz, ibidem, pp. 25ff.
161.
A. Kozak, Pojmowanie prawa w teorii wykładni [The Comprehension of Law in the Theory of Interpretation], AUW 1987 (1997), pp. 40ff. Cf. R. Guastini, ‘Interpretive Statements’, op. cit., pp. 281ff., who presents jurisprudential characterisation of a “mixed” theory of legal interpretation; namely, neither “cognitive” (which can also be called “traditional”) nor “sceptical” (which is sometimes referred to as “nihilistic”).
162.
M. Zieliński, ‘Współczesne problemy wykładni prawa’, op. cit., p. 9. Zieliński’s thesis is supported by the demands formulated in legal practice – see e.g., A. Gomułowicz, Aspekt prawotwórczy sądownictwa administracyjnego, op. cit., pp. 57ff., and the references cited therein.
163.
J.J. Moreso, ‘On the Truth-conditions of Norm Propositions’, op. cit., p. 68.
164.
In passing, it should be pointed out that the views on the possibility of a descriptive, evaluative or normative interpretation of the juristic utterances about the validity of legal norms are nothing new. As an example, we could quote a fragment of J. Jakubowski’s review (from 1962) of the W. Lang’s book: Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., p. 639: “It should be assumed that the expression ‘legal norm N is valid’ can be either a proposition about the norm or a norm about the norm or, ultimately, an evaluation of the norm. The question of what it is in a particular case, can be answered only by means of analysis of the particular utterance and, necessarily, of its context, yet even after such analysis has been completed, there still can remain some doubts”. The standpoint expressed by Jakubowski cannot be regarded as anticipating Eng’s theory, since “doubts” are not the same as the “modally fused” character of validity utterances; nevertheless, one can still perceive a strong resemblance here – at least in the approach to the logical nature of juristic utterances about valid law.
165.
Cf. Introduction, p. 4.
166.
See e.g., St.L. Paulson, ‘Faktum/Wert-Distinktion, Zwei-Welten-Lehre und immanenter Sinn. Hans Kelsen als Neukantianer’ in R. Alexy et al. (eds.), Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie, op. cit., pp. 226ff. and U. Neumann, ‘Wissenschaftstheorie der Rechtswissenschaft bei Hans Kelsen und Gustav Radbruch’, op. cit., pp. 37 ff.
167.
For more on the dualism of Is and Ought see e.g., J. Wróblewski, ‘Byt i powinność a błąd naturalistyczny w normatywizmie’ [Is and Ought and the Naturalistic Mistake in Normativism], SPE XXIX (1982), pp. 24ff.; N. Bobbio ‘“Sein” and “Sollen” in Legal Science’, op. cit., pp. 19ff.; R. Dreier, ‘Sein und Sollen’, op. cit., pp. 218ff.; G.H. von Wright, ‘Is and Ought’, op. cit., pp. 263ff. In the following explanation, it is quite irrelevant whether the dualism of Is and Ought is interpreted in ontological or epistemological terms; yet its content will be presented in the language of an ontological approach, thus leaving aside the epistemological, methodological and logical aspect of this distinction. On this last aspect see K. Opałek, J. Woleński, ‘Is, Ought, and Logic’, ARSP 73 (1987), pp. 373–385.
168.
This cornerstone of Kelsen’s theory refers in its content to the sphere of Sein in the form of the requirement of im großen und ganzen social efficacy of the (first) constitution and the norms of a given legal system established on its base – see e.g., J. Wróblewski, Krytyka normatywistycznej teorii prawa i państwa Hansa Kelsena [Critique of Hans Kelsen’s Normativist Theory of Law and State], Warszawa 1955, pp. 180ff. and a similar opinion of G. Hughes, cited in Chap. 7, note 424 at p. 343. For more on this issue see E. Bulygin, ‘An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, op. cit., pp. 33ff.
169.
See J. Woleński, ‘Semantyczne ujęcie dogmatyki prawa’ [A Semantic Approach to Legal Dogmatics], SF 2–3 (1985), pp. 88ff., where Woleński admits that Kelsen’s “sphere of Ought” can be identified with the “content of the class of postulated worlds”. Cf. also idem, ‘Możliwe światy teorii prawa’ [Possible Worlds of the Theory of Law] in S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński (eds.), Szkice z teorii prawa i szczegółowych nauk prawnych, op. cit., pp. 15ff.
170.
Another group of juristic utterances that belong to category A, for example, are descriptive and truth-oriented statements concerning past court decisions, and many others.
171.
Ustawa z dnia 21 kwietnia 2005 r. o utworzeniu Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy, published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 2005, No. 90, Item 755.
172.
See e.g., T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Język prawny a obraz świata’, op. cit., pp. 158ff., in particular p. 160, where he states that “by means of issuing a lawmaking act the changes in social reality take place”. For more on the performative function of legal and juristic utterances and the real effects of performatives see e.g., M. Zieliński, Z. Ziembiński, Uzasadnianie twierdzeń, ocen i norm w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., pp. 17ff. and W. Patryas, Performatywy w prawie, op. cit., pp. 90ff.
173.
Cf. supra, p. 371. In passing, let us note that even G.H. von Wright attributes to deontic logic (from the period of Norm and Action, i.e., from the early 1960s) the status, which he defines as “hybrid” – see idem, ‘Deontic Logic: A Personal View’, op. cit., p. 32. The Finnish philosopher has in mind that the deontic systems created by him were applicable not only in relation to (descriptively interpreted) norm propositions, but also to the norms that are prescriptive.
174.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 230–231. Yet, it should be recalled that according to Kelsen, Rechtssätze do possess a truth-value, which in light of the pragmatic analysis undertaken here, turns out to be partially incorrect – only some of the juristic validity utterances can be characterised in this way.
175.
Cf. supra, Chap. 7, pp. 282–284.
176.
On the textual and ordering juristic concepts, cf. supra, pp. 361–363.
177.
Perhaps it would be less speculative to provide an alternative explanation of the genesis of “modally fused” juristic utterances, which ignores the ontological aspect and is grounded in the description of relations between law and morality based on the distinction of internal, committed, detached and external juristic statements – for more on these categories see Chap. 6 at pp. 228–234.
178.
V. Villa, ‘Legal Theory and Value Judgments’, op. cit., p. 469.
179.
The indicated speech acts (recommendations, proposals, questions and advice) belong to the pragmatic category of directives, since they have a suggestive (influential) function, which is their defining feature.
180.
For more on the concept of norm-making competence see the references cited infra, note 303 at p. 430.
181.
Cf. supra, note 140 at p. 389.
182.
The concept of normative novelty was introduced by M. Zirk-Sadowski – see idem, ‘Problem nowości normatywnej’ [The Problem of Normative Novelty], SPE XXII, pp. 47–62, ‘Tak zwana prawotwórcza decyzja sądowego stosowania prawa’ [The so-called Lawmaking Decision of the Judicial Application of Law], SP 1–2 (1980), pp. 255ff. and ‘Precedens a tzw. decyzja prawotwórcza’ [The Precedent and the so-called Lawmaking Decision], PiP 6 (1980), pp. 74ff.
183.
This example is adjusted to the Poznań concept of legal norm, adapted in our clarificative analysis.
184.
Let us note that in the context of the purpose of our clarificative analysis, it is completely irrelevant whether we are dealing here with a behaviour prescribed by the norm which we recognise as valid or with any other behaviour. Nonetheless, in the further analysis, we will focus on the first possibility, because it is far more important from the jurisprudential point of view.
185.
Naturally, this also includes judicial validity utterances that do not have a lawmaking character, contained in the justifications of judicial decisions.
186.
See Chap. 4, pp. 95ff.
187.
The formula O(Op) thus reads as follows: “It is obligatory that is it obligatory that p”. It has to be stressed that in the course of the foregoing analysis the phrases “is obligatory” are both to be prescriptively interpreted.
188.
A. Ross, ‘Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law’, op. cit., pp. 62ff. Cf. idem, Directives and Norms, op. cit., pp. 156–157, where Ross formulates his argument in a condensed way.
189.
Ross’s original reasoning is reconstructed and slightly modified.
190.
A. Ross, ‘Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and Natural Law’, op. cit., p. 80.
191.
Although Ross does not pick up this topic in his criticism, it should be noted that Kelsen himself is not blameless here, because due to his statements, in which he recognised the similarity of Grundnorm to natural law, he undoubtedly contributed to the objection of quasi-positivism. For example, in the work Natural Law Doctrine and Legal Positivism, trans. W.H. Kraus, published as a supplement to the General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., Kelsen firstly admits: “The basic norm is not valid because it has been created in a certain way, but its validity is assumed by virtue of its content. It is valid, then, like a norm of natural law, apart from its merely hypothetical validity” (p. 401), and then he adds: “If one wishes to regard it as an element of a natural-law doctrine despite its renunciation of any element of material justice, very little objection can be raised…” and “[T]he theory of basic norm may be considered a natural-law doctrine in keeping with Kant’s transcendental logic” (p. 437). A similar standpoint is expressed by Kelsen in his study ‘Vom Geltungsgrund des Rechts’, op. cit., p. 165, where he acknowledges a “certain similarity” (gewisse Ähnlichkeit) between natural-law doctrine and the pure theory of law; namely, that the theory of the validity of positive law in Reine Rechtslehre can only be justified by means of a norm that is no longer a positive norm. Leaving aside much more numerous fragments of Kelsen’s studies, in which he explicitly rejects the natural-law interpretation of Grundnorm, thus highlighting the fallacy of natural law (for more on this issue see e.g., J. Raz, ‘Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm’, op cit., pp. 129ff.), it should be clarified that a decisive counterargument against attributing a natural law character to his theory of Grundnorm lies in the fact that this norm does not constitute a category of practical philosophy, but the transcendental-logical category and, thus – as aptly noted by Neumann – it “constitutes the normativity of law in the sense of deontic thinking, which is opposed to the form of thinking about what exists; yet it does not oblige the citizen or a judge – in the moral or specifically legal sense – to a certain behaviour” – idem, ‘Problem obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., pp. 39–40.
192.
For the sake of simplicity, hereafter we use the terms “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably.
193.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 234ff. This contradiction does not occur for at least two reasons. Firstly, let us recall that the perspective of legal research, referred to as “a morally detached point of view”, does not preclude that the lawyers who formulate juristic statements about law, approve of them morally. Yet, it is hard not to notice that a purely normative (in the moral sense) method of interpreting juristic validity utterances, based on Ross’s argument, strongly weighs in favour of recognising them as committed statements in Raz’s sense, rather than as detached statements. Secondly, it does not seem necessary to assume – after Ross – that a legally redundant duty (obligation) of law obedience must be of a moral nature.
194.
Cf. infra, argument A–XIV presented at pp. 414–415. For the record, let us note that sometimes one can encounter the thesis about the possibility of reconciling the moral character of the propositions about law with legal positivism – see e.g., N.E. Simmonds, ‘The Nature of Propositions of Law’, op. cit., pp. 97ff.
195.
Let us add that both of the cited works demonstrate that Ross and Hart quite independently reached very similar conclusions about Grundnorm theory, which naturally strengthens the presumption of their correctness.
196.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 246, a note to p. 97.
197.
Ibidem.
198.
E. Bulygin, ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., pp. 18–19.
199.
E. Bulygin, ‘An Antinomy in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law’, op. cit., pp. 43–44. Let us add that in his later study, ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., pp. 19ff., Bulygin proposed the interpretation of the normative validity of law in accordance with his own conception of legal validity – understood as the applicability of legal norms, which has already been analysed in Chap. 7 at pp. 321–334.
200.
E. Bulygin, ‘¿Está (parte de) la filosofía del Derecho basada en un error?’, op. cit., p. 19.
201.
P.E. Navarro, ‘Tensiones conceptuales en el positivismo jurídico’, op. cit., pp. 146ff.
202.
Ibidem, p. 148.
203.
J.-R. Sieckmann, ‘Basic Rights in the Model of Principles’, ARSP Bh. 67 (1997), p. 30.
204.
Z. Ziemba, ‘Zwrot “norma N obowiązuje” w języku prawnym i prawniczym’, op. cit. We will use Ziemba’s argumentation in the course of the critical analysis of normative conceptions of legal validity – see infra, pp. 418ff., in particular, the argument A–XVI.
205.
Cf. infra, note 225 at p. 410.
206.
Zasady techniki prawodawczej. Załącznik do Rozporządzenia Prezesa Rady Ministrów z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r. w sprawie “Zasad techniki prawodawczej” [Principles of Legislative Technique. Annex to the Regulation of the Prime Minister of 20 June 2002 on “Principles of Legislative Technique”], published in Dziennik Ustaw [Journal of Statutes] 2002, No. 100, Item 908.
207.
Cf. Chap. 7, note 354 at p. 326.
208.
S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Komentarz do zasad techniki prawodawczej z dnia 20 czerwca 2002 r., op. cit., pp. 34–35.
209.
Ibidem, p. 48.
210.
In the context of this discussion, there appears to be an interesting question of the normativity of Article 83 of the Polish Constitution, which states that: “Everyone has an obligation to obey the laws of the Republic of Poland”. I believe that even if we accept a legal redundancy of the “obligation to obey the law” expressed by this article, one can defend the view that this provision contains a normative element, because the term “everyone” – used in its formulation – can provide an important clue to facilitating the determination of the addressees of the individual legal norms in Polish legal order. Leaving aside the question of normativity, we believe that this provision is quite reasonable, not least because of its suggestive and educational function.
211.
R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., p. 159 [English version, pp. 98–99].
212.
Ibidem, pp. 164–165 [English version, pp. 101–102].
213.
In the original: “Ich bin verpflichtet, das zu tun, wovon Peter sagt, daß ich verpflichtet bin, es zu tun” (ibidem, p. 165).
214.
C.E. Alchourrón, ‘Logic of Norms and Logic of Normative Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 245ff. We use the notation proposed by Alchourrón because of its simplicity, but it has to be added that this is a notation of deontic logic, rather than in the logic of norms, which is nonetheless irrelevant here since the provided formula does not express any iteration of obligations, regardless of how – normatively or deontically – we will interpret it.
215.
In Alchourrón’s deontic logic (which he called “normative”, but it is just a matter of terminology that is opposite to the commonly accepted one, which should not mislead us) the proposition referred to in the text follows directly from the definition of the strong obligation; that is, an obligation clearly established by some norm-giving authority. This definition is as follows: s = NxO, whilst one of the fundamental theorems, being a consequence of this definition, has the following form: NxOp ≡ sp – cf. ibidem, pp. 249–250.
216.
According to the taxonomy of speech acts, elaborated by J.L. Austin and amended by J.R. Searle, this norm belongs to the category of commissives, i.e. those acts “whose point is to commit the speaker … to some future course of action” – J.R. Searle, ‘A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts’, op. cit., p. 356.
217.
See G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, op. cit., p. 189.
218.
Ibidem, pp. 190ff.
219.
For more on the two types of Ought (Sein-Sollen/Dürfen and Tun-Sollen/Dürfen), distinguished by von Wright, see infra, pp. 439–440.
220.
Let us quote the entire sentence which was the source of this opinion: “The forbidden thing can be an action (e.g. smoking), but its being forbidden is a norm and not an action; therefore it makes no sense (in this system) to speak of the permittedness of a prohibition” – G.H. von Wright, ‘Ought to be – Ought to do’ in idem, Six Essays in Philosophical Logic, APhF LX (1996), p. 63.
221.
G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, op. cit., p. ix. It should be noted that in the first system of deontic logic developed by von Wright, the possibility of the iterability of operators is not mentioned at all – cf. idem, ‘Deontic Logic’, Mind 60 (1951), pp. 1–15.
222.
G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action, op. cit., p. ix. Quotation mark in the original.
223.
Ibidem.
224.
See C.E. Alchourrón, ‘Logic of Norms and Logic of Normative Propositions’, op. cit., pp. 263ff.
225.
Ibidem, p. 264. This formula naturally arouses associations with the norms of a norm-making competence, which were thoroughly examined by P. Grabowski from the perspective of their potential metanormativity – see idem, O metajęzykowości i metanormatywności języka prawnego [On Matalinguisticity and Metanormativity of Legal Language], Poznań 2001, pp. 65–76 [an unpublished manuscript of a Master’s thesis]. In the context of the correctness of Ross’s argument, it is worth quoting in full the passage of his work, which contains arguments consistent with the reasoning presented by the Danish philosopher. Grabowski, while considering the possibility of interpreting the norms of norm-making competence as metanorms, provides the following objection: “It can be moreover indicated that the norm of a norm-making competence does not meet the condition imposed on the legal norms, namely it is not itself suitable to independently identify what behaviour was ordered (prohibited) to a group of subjects in specific circumstances. Treating it as the norm which prescribes the behaviour consistent with further normative acts, sounds very vague and seems to be meaningless. Accordingly, the objection that can be raised in connection thereto is that this obligation is so indetermined that such expression should be denied the character of a norm. The legal norm should allow its addressee to recognise what actually her/his duties are, while the indication that it consists in behaving in accordance with some other norms that firstly, may not be implemented into the legal system, and secondly, may not be applicable, does not explain anything” (p. 71).
226.
Especially that – as Alchourrón emphasises – we must assume a “clear distinction” between the formulas OOp and ONxOp (= Osp), and only in reference to the latter does he add that it has “a clear meaning” – C.E. Alchourrón, ‘Logic of Norms and Logic of Normative Propositions’, op. cit., p. 263.
227.
J. Woleński, ‘Obowiązywanie a prawdziwość’, op. cit., p. 15. It should be noted that Woleński provides another formulation of this utterance – for those who find the quoted one to be of a blatant style: “It is valid that the payment of the equalization tax by the citizens with high income is prescribed” – ibidem, note 5 at p. 16.
228.
Ibidem, p. 16.
229.
See R. Lippold, ‘Geltung, Wirksamkeit und Verbindlichkeit von Rechtsnormen’, op. cit., pp. 470–471.
230.
There is a relationship with a distinction – repeatedly used by Kelsen – between the objective and the subjective sense of Ought – cf. e.g., idem, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 7ff., 45ff. [English version, pp. 7ff., 44ff.], ‘Vom Geltungsgrund des Rechts’, op. cit., pp. 161ff., and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 21–22, 43–44.
231.
It should be emphasised that this conclusion applies to all juristic validity utterances – both positive and negative, including prima facie normative negative utterances about validity by means of which the constitutional courts deprive legal norms of their validity. As it has already been demonstrated, such derogatory utterances have a performative nature, so they are true by definition, which excludes their purely normative interpretation – cf. supra, pp. 390–391.
232.
Let us recall that in Kelsen’s conception, the validity, understood normatively (“Geltung qua Verbindlichkeit”), consists in the ought to obey the law, and in case of non-obedience, in the ought to apply the law by the competent state authorities – cf. the definitions of the normative validity provided by Kelsen in the General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., p. 39, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 196 [English version, p. 193], ‘Was ist juristischer Positivismus?’, op. cit., p. 465 and 467, and Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 3 and 112.
233.
According to Lang’s conception, the validity of a legal norm is defined by means of a categorical metanorm (a norm about the norm). In his view, both in legal and juristic language, the phrase: “Norm N is valid” means that: “One ought to apply norm N” – see idem, ‘Obowiązywanie normy prawnej w czasie w świetle logiki norm’, op. cit., p. 49 and Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 158–159.
234.
See e.g., E. Garzón Valdés, ‘Modelle normativer Geltung’, op. cit., where the Spanish philosopher reconstructs and discusses the conceptions of legal validity developed by H. Kelsen, J. Austin, H.L.A. Hart and G.H. von Wright. When considering the latest theories, it is worth noting the one presented by G. Sartor, who proposes a purely normative concept of legal validity as “doxastic obligation”; i.e., an obligation of accepting the valid legal norms (rules) in legal reasoning – see idem, ‘Legal Validity as Doxastic Obligation: From Definition to Normativity’, op. cit. and Legal Reasoning. A Cognitive Approach to the Law, Dordrecht 2005, pp. 331ff.
235.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 321–334.
236.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 269–270.
237.
The comparative analysis of legal rules and rules of chess has been made by many legal theorists – e.g., by Cz. Znamierowski, H.L.A. Hart, Z. Ziembiński and G.H. von Wright. In the recent literature, see A. Marmor, ‘How Law is Like Chess’, LT 12 (2006), pp. 347–371.
238.
U. Neumann, ‘Problem obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., p. 42.
239.
In this reasoning, the formula V(Op) means that the norm Op is valid (V); the formula O(Op) means that it is obligatory that p is obligatory; whereas the formula O_X(O_L p) means (in accordance with the previous analysis of Ross’s argument) that it is obligatory in a certain, most probably moral sense (O_X) that p is obligatory in legal sense (O_L p).
240.
Cf. supra, note 200 at p. 406, with the corresponding text.
241.
Cf. Chap. 5, pp. 201–202, 207.
242.
Cf. Chap. 4, pp. 123–125.
243.
For more on legal postpositivism see Epilogue, pp. 539–541.
244.
This problem has been discussed in Chap. 5 at pp. 207–212.
245.
See R. Guastini, ‘“Sollsätze”. An Exercise in Hard Legal Positivism’, RT 31 (2000), pp. 188ff.
246.
In Guastini’s analysis, these are deontic and not normative operators, which is, however, irrelevant here, because they are still subject to reduction, indicated by him.
247.
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., p. 39.
248.
A similar interpretation seems to be acceptable in relation to the definition of the validity of a legal norm provided by Kelsen in Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 196 [English version, p. 193]: “Daß eine sich auf das Verhalten eines Menschen beziehende Norm ‘gilt’, bedeutet, daß sie verbindlich ist, daß sich der Mensch in der von der Norm bestimmten Weise verhalten soll”. Here, on the other hand, the penultimate sentence seems to be of a metanormative character O(Op), while the last sentence – only of a normative one: Op. At this point, we need to clarify a certain doubt that may arise in relation to Kelsen’s normative concept of legal validity, which is associated with the fact that he did not accept the “operational” standpoint on the extension of legal utterances, which can be attributed with a truth-oriented character (we touched upon this issue supra, at pp. 384ff.). The author of normativism emphasised that juristic utterances about validity (like other Rechtssätze) are true or false – cf. e.g., Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 177. This may arouse some doubts as to whether his conception of legal validity is indeed purely normative. Yet, such doubts are unfounded, since Kelsen repeatedly emphasised that the validity (Geltung) belongs to the realm of Sollen, and not of Sein – see e.g., Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 10 [English version, p. 10] and ‘Was ist juristischer Positivismus?’, op. cit., p. 467.
249.
See R. Guastini, ‘“Sollsätze”. ‘An Exercise in Hard Legal Positivism’, op. cit., p. 187.
250.
Ibidem.
251.
J. Wróblewski, Sądowe stosowanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 94–95 [English version, p. 76].
252.
See ibidem, pp. 96ff. [English version, pp. 77ff.].
253.
Cf. the analysis of the “argument from tû-tû” in Chap. 7 at pp. 272–274.
254.
Cf. supra, pp. 380–396.
255.
See Z. Ziemba, ‘Zwrot “norma N obowiązuje” w języku prawnym i prawniczym’, op. cit., pp. 108ff.
256.
W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., p. 190.
257.
Lang indeed writes both about “the normative verification of validity” as well as about “the verification of the judgments that determine the validity of norms”, which seems at least terminologically incorrect if we consider that he himself emphasises that these judgments are well founded or unfounded rather than true or false – cf. ibidem, pp. 187ff., in particular, p. 190. Cf. the critique of Z. Ziemba, ‘Zwrot “norma N obowiązuje” w języku prawnym i prawniczym’, op. cit., pp. 108ff. It would be much easier if Lang held – just like Kelsen did – that the validity of a legal norm is unverifiable, but at most justifiable, whereas the utterances about the validity of norms can be verifiable – cf. e.g., idem, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 143–144. Although in light of the earlier pragmatic analysis of the juristic validity utterances, Kelsen’s standpoint seems to be erroneous, it is at least consistent terminologically. Namely, according to him, these are the sentences in a logical sense (propositions) that are verifiable, and not metanorms, as Lang holds.
258.
Cf. W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 190ff.
259.
Ibidem, p. 193.
260.
This formula reads as follows: [(p > q) ∙ p] > q, where the variables are replaced by “the sentences that state the validity of legal norms” – ibidem, p. 195. It is therefore logically equivalent to the scheme of inference presented in the text.
261.
Let us note here the lack of a clear justification that the validity of the norm of competence Z implies the validity of the norm X; that is, the norm established on the basis and in accordance with Z. If we wanted to express such a missing premise, for example by means of the proposition: V(Op) → V(Oq), then in order to obtain the logical correctness of the presented reasoning, we would have to prove that this premise is true, whereas undoubtedly this is not the case, as proved by the reasons presented in the text.
262.
For more see e.g., K. Opałek, ‘Statisches und dynamisches Normensystem’ in H. Mayer (ed.), Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis. Festschrift für Robert Walter zum 60. Geburtstag, Wien 1991, pp. 507–518.
263.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 301–304.
264.
Cf. H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 136 and 144. Let us add that according to Kelsen, there never exists any “absolute guarantee” that the lower norm will correspond to a higher one which determines the creation and the contents of the former – cf. idem, General Theory of Law and State, op. cit., pp. 154–155, and – in the context of law application – that the validity of a lower (individual) norm is not deduced from the validity of a higher (general) norm – cf. idem, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 185ff. For more on this issue see L. Gianformaggio, ‘Hans Kelsen on the Deduction of Validity’, RT 21 (1990), pp. 198ff.
265.
Although it is obvious, let us note the fact that many legal norms are recognised by the constitutional courts as invalid, even though they have been established by the competent authority and under the proper, legally prescribed legislative procedure.
266.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 351–354.
267.
Cf. supra, pp. 365–367.
268.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 271–343.
269.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 344–349.
270.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 245–246.
271.
For editorial reasons, the content of this distinction and the reasons for including it in the system of connected concepts will be presented infra in the final part of the forthcoming Section 5, at pp. 438–440.
272.
See D. von der Pfordten, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Begriffen, insbesondere im Recht’ in B. Schünemann et al. (eds.), Gerechtigkeitswissenschaft – Kolloquium aus Anlass des 70. Geburtstages von Lothar Philipps, Berlin 2005, pp. 215ff.
273.
In the original graphic presentation, proposed by D. von der Pfordten, the differences between the concepts are expressed by means of a vertical character | (and not, as in the above diagram, a horizontal minus sign), for example “A | B” represents the difference between the general concepts A and B.
274.
See S. Wronkowska, Analiza pojęcia prawa podmiotowego [Analysis of the Concept of Subjective Right] Poznań 1973, pp. 17ff. Cf. eadem, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 163ff.
275.
Let us note here a certain analogy to the method of conceptual analysis that was recommended by Strawson and is used by us in the undertaken clarification.
276.
S. Wronkowska, Analiza pojęcia prawa podmiotowego, op. cit., p. 17.
277.
As Wronkowska states: “in case of lawyers’ interests, we generally deal with situations that arise for particular subjects in relation with currently valid legal norms, rather than just merely postulated norms” – ibidem, p. 6.
278.
Ibidem, pp. 19ff.
279.
In addition to the obligatory actions, Wronkowska distinguishes permissible, optional and indifferent actions – see ibidem, pp. 19ff. Cf. eadem, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 163ff.; S. Wronkowska, Z. Ziembiński, Zarys teorii prawa, op. cit., pp. 101ff.; Z. Ziembiński, ‘O aparaturze pojęciowej dotyczącej sytuacji prawnych’, op. cit., pp. 38ff.
280.
S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Problemy i zasady techniki redagowania tekstów prawnych, op. cit., p. 34.
281.
See e.g., Z. Ziembiński, ‘O aparaturze pojęciowej dotyczącej sytuacji prawnych’, op. cit. and J. Mikołajewicz, Prawo intertemporalne, op. cit., pp. 57ff.
282.
I rely here on U. Neumann’s opinion, expressed in his unpublished lecture ‘Die Bedeutung der Rechtsdogmatik in der deutschen Rechtskultur’, Frankfurt am Main 2001, p. 2.
283.
Cf. supra, pp. 366–367 and Chap. 7, p. 355.
284.
See H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 39ff, 167ff.
285.
J. Woleński, ‘Obowiązywanie a prawdziwość’, op. cit., p. 24.
286.
K. Grzegorczyk, T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Les rapports entre la norme et la disposition légale’, APhD XIX (1974), pp. 243–256.
287.
In short these features are: 1. a certain sign has been issued, 2. this sign is directed to an addressee and indicates certain conduct, 3. the sign has been created in accordance with the accepted procedure, 4. the conduct indicated by the sign is classified positively or negatively, 5. the legislator associates the indicated conduct with a certain conventional effect, 6. the addressee of the sign exists, 7.-8. the indicated behaviour is neither necessary nor impossible – ibidem, pp. 252–253.
288.
Ibidem, pp. 253ff. For more on the category of the “productive use of utterances” see T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Język prawny a język prawniczy’, op. cit., pp. 229ff.
289.
The identification of a conceptual relation between a legal norm understood as a certain situation or an element of such a situation, and the pragmatic conception of a legal norm is naturally nothing new. Let us quote here J. Wróblewski, who wrote: “The legal norm exists as a part of a given situation whose elements are persons, their behaviour and experience. Such approach may be related to pragmatic understanding of the norm as a ‘speech act’, which serves a suggestive function, thus influencing the conduct of certain people” – W. Lang, J. Wróblewski, S. Zawadzki, Teoria państwa i prawa, op. cit., p. 343.
290.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 6. Italics in the original.
291.
We should add a comment – somehow obvious in the light of the previous analyses and their goals – that the problem of the normativity of law is interpreted here as the problem of explaining the use of normative concepts in validity utterances which are formulated in juristic language.
292.
There are two possibilities that are most likely to be brought to mind in this context (apart from the already discussed concept of legal situation). Firstly, one can apply the thesis on the firmness (i.e., peremptory character) of legal norms – often encountered in the Polish jurisprudential literature, and in particular in the studies of K. Opałek. According to him, in contrast to the weaker directives without a rigid influence, the legal norms leave their addressees no choice in deciding how to behave – cf. e.g., K. Opałek, Z teorii dyrektyw i norm [On the Theory of Directives and Norms], Warszawa 1974, pp. 152ff. [German version: Theorie der Directiven und der Normen, Wien/New York 1986, pp. 97ff.] and K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Prawo. Metodologia, filozofia, teoria prawa, op. cit., pp. 192ff. Secondly, one can rely on the conception of norms as exclusionary reasons, developed by J. Raz – cf. e.g., idem, ‘Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms’, op. cit., pp. 482ff. and Practical Reason and Norms, op. cit., pp. 35ff., 73ff., 182 ff.
293.
For more see M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Rola pragmatyki w badaniach języka prawnego’, op. cit., and ‘Legal Norm as a Pragmatic Category’, op. cit.; A. Bator, Użycie normy prawnej w regulacji stosunków gospodarczych, op. cit., pp. 75ff.
294.
M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Legal Norm as a Pragmatic Category’, op. cit., p. 204.
295.
Cf. A. Grabowski, Judicial Argumentation and Pragmatics, op. cit., pp. 87ff. When considering the international theory of law, C.E. Alchourrón’s and E. Bulygin’s expressive conception of norms is most similar to the pragmatic conception of norms presented below – see iidem, ‘The Expressive Conception of Norms’ in R. Hilpinen (ed.), New Essays in Deontic Logic, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1981, pp. 95–124. Cf. O. Weinberger’s interesting criticism in ‘The Expressive Conception of Norms – An Impasse for the Logic of Norms’, L&Ph 4 (1985), pp. 165–198.
296.
On the non-linguistic concept of legal norms see e.g., J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 105ff.; K. Opałek, ‘Der Dualismus der Auffassung der Normen in der Rechtswissenschaft’, op. cit.; T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘The Non-Linguistic Concept of Norm and Ontology’ in W. Krawietz, J. Wróblewski (eds.), Sprache, Performanz und Ontologie de Rechts. Festgabe für Kazimierz Opałek zum 75. Geburtstag, Berlin 1993, pp. 423–434; A. Bator, Użycie normy prawnej w regulacji stosunków gospodarczych, op. cit., pp. 97ff.
297.
M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Legal Norm as a Pragmatic Category’, op. cit. and A. Bator, ibidem, pp. 75ff.
298.
See e.g., Z. Ziembiński, M. Zieliński, Dyrektywy i sposób ich wypowiadania, op. cit., pp. 14ff. and Uzasadnianie twierdzeń, ocen i norm w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., pp. 11ff.
299.
Cf. A. Grabowski, B. Naleziński, ‘Kłopoty z obowiązywaniem’, op. cit., pp. 242ff. and A. Grabowski, ‘Dylemat Jørgensena z perspektywy pragmatycznej’ [The Jørgensen’s Dilemma from a Pragmatic Perspective] in Z. Tobor, I. Bogucka (eds.), Prawoznawstwo a praktyka stosowania prawa, PNUŚ 2052 (2002), pp. 205ff.
300.
See e.g., J.R. Searle, ‘What is a Speech Act?’ in M. Black (ed.), Philosophy in America, London 1965, pp. 231ff. and Speech Acts, op. cit., pp. 54ff.
301.
For more on the conception of secondary institutional (formal) speech acts, based on the ideas of D. Wunderlich, N. MacCormick and Z. Bańkowski, see A. Grabowski, Judicial Argumentation and Pragmatics, op. cit., pp. 44ff. and ‘Dylemat Jørgensena z perspektywy pragmatycznej’, op. cit., pp. 199ff., and the references cited therein.
302.
For more on the suggestive and the similar pragmatic functions of legal norms cf. M. Zieliński, Z. Ziembiński, Uzasadnianie twierdzeń, ocen i norm w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., pp. 16–17; J. Wróblewski, ‘Reguły prawne w analitycznej teorii prawa’, op. cit., p. 14; M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Legal Norm as a Pragmatic Category’, op. cit., pp. 210, 213ff.
303.
Among the notably impressive Polish literature see e.g., K. Świrydowicz, Analiza logiczna pojęcia kompetencji normodawczej, op. cit.; M. Zieliński, ‘Dwa nurty pojmowania “kompetencji”’ [Two Trends of Understanding “Competence”] in H. Olszewski, B. Popowska (eds.), Gospodarka. Administracja. Samorząd, Poznań 1997, pp. 581–607; A. Bator, Kompetencja w prawie i prawoznawstwie [Competence in Law and Jurisprudence], AUW 2602 (2004); M. Matczak, Kompetencja organu administracji publicznej [Competence of the Organ of Public Administration], Kraków 2004, in particular pp. 75ff.
304.
M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Tak zwana prawotwórcza decyzja sądowego stosowania prawa’, op. cit., pp. 254ff. Let us add that this rule is directly manifested in the second preparatory condition.
305.
Cf. ibidem, p. 254.
306.
See J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, op. cit., p. 66 and J.R. Searle, D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, op. cit., pp. 37ff., 100–101, 201.
307.
J.R. Searle, D. Vanderveken, ibidem, p. 201. Let us note that in the above-proposed essential condition, the absence of the option of refusal is understood more broadly, since in the institutional context of creating legal norms, the self-commitment of a legislator to deny the addresses of norms the “option of refusal” is meaningless – the law mostly consists of heteronomous norms which define someone else’s rather than one’s own commitments (obligations). Moreover, it is obvious that the legislator may change the valid laws at any time.
308.
See D. González Lagier, Acción y norma en G.H. von Wright, op. cit., p. 278ff.
309.
Cf. e.g., J. Jakubowski, ‘Pojęcie obowiązywania, realizacji i skuteczności normy prawnej oraz podstawy ich rozróżniania’, op. cit., pp. 313ff.; Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 412ff.; S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 120; K. Pałecki, Prawoznawstwo – zarys wykładu, op. cit., pp. 137ff.
310.
Cf. supra, note 292 at p. 426.
311.
Cf. S. Wronkowska, Analiza pojęcia prawa podmiotowego, op. cit., p. 16.
312.
We refer here to the distinction between the five modal interpretations of ought-utterances, containing the modal verb “may”, provided by Z. Ziembiński, Practical Logic, op. cit., pp. 146ff.
313.
Cf. the arguments against the normative comprehension of legal validity, discussed supra at pp. 425–426.
314.
J. Wróblewski, ‘Metody logiczno-językowe w prawoznawstwie’ [Logico-Linguistic Methods in Jurisprudence] in A. Łopatka (ed.), Metody badania prawa, Wrocław 1973, p. 69.
315.
M. Zieliński, ‘Współczesne problemy wykładni prawa’, op. cit., pp. 5–6.
316.
K. Opałek, ‘Der Begriff des positiven Rechts’, op. cit., p. 453. A similar opinion in the context of Polish legal culture has been expressed by H. Rot and W. Gromski, ‘Prawo stanowione’, op. cit., pp. 38ff.
317.
L.L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law, op. cit., p. 43. Fuller uses the term “made law” instead of “statutory law”, but it does not make any difference. Similarly H. Rot, W. Gromski, ibidem, pp. 35–36.
318.
The concept of the enacted law in the strict sense is applied by L. Morawski, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 96.
319.
In Polish literature cf. e.g., H. Rot, W. Gromski, ‘Prawo stanowione’, op. cit., p. 36 and S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 21, 24ff. For more on this form of lawmaking in the context of the Polish legal order see T. Chauvin, ‘Próba wprowadzenia do teorii umów prawotwórczych’ [The Attempt of Introduction to the Theory of Lawmaking Contracts] in J. Stelmach (ed.), Filozofia prawa wobec globalizmu, op. cit., pp. 83–90.
320.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 237–245.
321.
See e.g., H. Rot, W. Gromski, ‘Prawo stanowione’, op. cit., p. 39; L. Morawski, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 97ff.; S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 24ff.
322.
For more on this method, typical for analytical philosophy see e.g., J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 52ff.
323.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 265–267.
324.
Cf. supra, pp. 370–400. Let us add that probably the definiens of the postpositivist definition also has a “modally fused” status, yet this is only a speculation, which will be verified in the next chapter, devoted to the extension of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory norms.
325.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 241–242 and Chap. 7, note 130 at p. 277.
326.
Let us recall that we are dealing with the factual relativisation of validity within the conception of legal validity founded on the concept of the applicability of norms – cf. Chap. 7, pp. 321ff.
327.
M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Rationality of Legal Discourse in Relation to Legal Ethics’ in W. Krawietz et al. (eds.), The Reasonable as Rational?, op. cit., p. 615. Quotation marks in the original.
328.
Cf. Chap. 2, p. 19, and the references cited in note 29.
329.
For more on the arguments used in validity discourse see Chap. 9, pp. 500–503, 521ff.
330.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 253ff., 284ff., 333.
331.
M. Bańko, Inny słownik języka polskiego PWN [The PWN’s Different Dictionary of Polish Language], Vol. I, Warszawa 2000, p. 1113.
332.
See M. Atienza, J. Ruiz Manero, Las piezas del Derecho, op. cit., pp. 7ff. [English version, pp. 7ff.].
333.
What is meant here is a hyletic conception of norms presented by C.E. Alchourrón and E. Bulygin in Normative Systems, op. cit., pp. 15ff., 28ff., 34ff.
334.
M. Atienza, J. Ruiz Manero, Las piezas del Derecho, op. cit., pp. 7–8 [English version, pp. 6–7].
335.
Ibidem, pp. 180–181 [English version, pp. 178–179].
336.
See G.H. von Wright, ‘Ought to be – Ought to do’, op. cit, pp. 63–64, 68ff. Yet, it should be noted that von Wright used this distinction already in his earlier works – see e.g., idem, Norm and Action, op. cit., pp. 13ff. For more see D. González Lagier, Acción y norma en G.H. von Wright, op. cit., pp. 431ff.
337.
Von Wright does not refer to any specific German sources in the analysed study, yet in the earlier treatise, Norm and Action, op. cit., notes 1–2 on p. 14, he points at Nicolai Hartmann and – indirectly – at Max Scheler, whereas among the Anglo-Saxon philosophers he mentions G.E. Moore.
338.
G.H. von Wright, ‘Ought to be – Ought to do’, op. cit., p. 68.
339.
In particular, we believe that there is no risk of confusing the norms of end with the teleological norms (directives), i.e. norms in which we deal with the instrumental relation between the means and the ends. For more on teleological norms see e.g., Z. Ziembiński, Problemy podstawowe prawoznawstwa, op. cit., pp. 126ff. and T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Normy celowościowe a reguły konstytutywne w prawie’ [Teleological Norms and Constitutive Rules in Law] in A. Bodnar et al. (eds.), Prawo i polityka, Warszawa 1988, pp. 102–112, and the references cited therein.
340.
Cf. T. Gizbert-Studnicki, A. Grabowski, ‘Normy programowe w Konstytucji’ [Programme Norms in the Constitution] in J. Trzciński (ed.), Charakter i struktura norm konstytucji, Warszawa 1997, pp. 101ff.
341.
Cf. e.g., G.H. von Wright, ‘Ought to be – Ought to do’, op. cit., p. 69 and J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, Methods of Legal Reasoning, op. cit., pp. 40ff.
342.
It should be noted, however, that we introduce here only the linguistic modification of the formulation used in the definition of legal norms developed by the Poznań school of jurisprudence, since the authors and supporters of this conception interpret it in such a way that this concept includes, besides the norms of action, also the norms of end. The difference lies only in the applied terminology – cf. e.g., M. Zieliński, Z. Ziembiński, Uzasadnianie twierdzeń, ocen i norm w prawoznawstwie, op. cit., pp. 59ff. and S. Wronkowska, Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa, op. cit., p. 164.
343.
Cf. Chap. 6, pp. 222–226.
344.
Cf. Chap. 7, the arguments A–III and A–IV (directed against understanding the legal validity of norms as their membership in the legal system) at pp. 289–309 and the argument A-VI (against defining validity by means of the concept of law application) at pp. 316–319.
345.
See A. Wilczyńska, ‘Wokół definicji cywilnego nieposłuszeństwa’ [Around the Definition of Civil Disobedience] in T. Pietrzykowski (ed.), W kręgu teorii prawa i zagadnień prawa europejskiego, Sosnowiec 2007, pp. 133–148, and the references cited therein.
346.
Ibidem, pp. 134, 137ff.
347.
In the original: “Gegen jeden, der es unternimmt, diese Ordnung zu beseitigen, haben alle Deutschen das Recht zum Widerstand, wenn andere Abhilfe nicht möglich ist”.
348.
We will therefore deal with a situation similar to that which may arise, for example, when the citizen uses the institution of constitutional complaint, claiming that a given legal provision or statute is unconstitutional.
349.
In such a case, the legal norm is usually regarded by lawyers as valid, even though there exists a legal option of refusing its fulfilment (implementation). Such empirical negation of the analysed implication is naturally utterly irrelevant in the context of the correctness of the definition under discussion. This definition, in fact, talks about the existence of “legal options of refusing” rather than about making actual use of them by legal subjects.
350.
Cf. supra, p. 366.
351.
Cf. supra, pp. 437–438.
352.
Cf. Chap. 7, the argument A–VI (against the definition of validity understood as a norm application) at pp. 316–319 and the argument A–XII (against the definitions of validity understood as an observance or efficacy of norms) at pp. 338–339.
353.
On the concept of normative hierarchy in the aspects of competence and of derogation, see K. Płeszka, Hierarchia w systemie prawa, op. cit., pp. 53ff., 65ff.
354.
Cf. Chap. 7, the argument A–V (against the definition of validity understood as the application of norms) at pp. 313–316, the argument A–IX (against the definition of validity understood as the applicability of norms) at pp. 327–331, and the argument A–XIII (against the definitions of validity understood as the observance or efficacy of norms) at pp. 339–343.
355.
See e.g., R. Walter, ‘Normy prawne’ [Legal Norms], trans. K. Opałek, KSP XXI (1988), pp. 98ff. Cf. H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 76ff.
356.
See M. Atienza, J. Ruiz Manero, Las piezas del Derecho, op. cit., in particular, the schematic classification of these utterances at pp. 177ff. [English version, pp. 175ff.]. Cf. D.W.P. Ruiter, ‘Eine rechtstheoretisch fundierte Typologie gesetzlicher Rechtsnormen’, RT 17 (1986), pp. 478–500.
357.
Cf. supra, pp. 438–439.
358.
Cf. H. Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., pp. 83, 210ff. It should yet be added that Kelsen’s standpoint on implicating prescribing norms (Gebieten) by authorising norms (Ermächtigen), or the reductibility of the latter to the former ones concerned only the authorisation (competence) to establish the norms (Normsetzung). See also idem, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd ed., op. cit., pp. 15–16, 55ff., 123ff. [English version, pp. 15–16, 54ff., 118ff.].
359.
Ross wrote: “The norms of competence are reductible to norms of conduct…” – On Law and Justice, op. cit., p. 33 and cf. also ibidem, pp. 50, 162 and Directives and Norms, op. cit., pp. 118ff. In the Polish literature, Ross’s views on the reductibility of the norms of competence to the norms of conduct can be found in K. Świrydowicz, Analiza logiczna pojęcia kompetencji normodawczej, op. cit., pp. 51–52 and M. Matczak, Kompetencja organu administracji publicznej, op. cit., pp. 84ff.
360.
Cf. the reconstructions of Ziembiński’s conception in M. Zieliński, ‘Dwa nurty pojmowania “kompetencji”’, op. cit., p. 583 and M. Matczak, ibidem, pp. 91ff., and the references cited therein.
361.
See K. Świrydowicz, S. Wronkowska, M. Zieliński, Z. Ziembiński, ‘O nieporozumieniach dotyczących tzw. “norm zezwalających”’ [On Misunderstandings Concerning the So-called Permitting Norms], PiP 7 (1975), pp. 57–64.
362.
Cf. infra, note 388 at p. 452, with the corresponding text.
363.
The power to independently shape the content of the legal relationship undoubtedly cannot be regarded as “the legal option of refusing” in the sense of the postpositivist definition of validity, since we are dealing here with the problem of the application of law, rather than validity of norms – for more see M. Piotrowski, Normy prawne imperatywne i dyspozytywne [Imperative and Dispositive Legal Norms], Warszawa/Poznań 1990, pp. 21ff., and the references cited therein.
364.
It would be naturally absurd to provide such an interpretation of the proposed definition under which all “norms” that are not orders or prohibitions are valid, because there is certainly no possibility of refusing the implementation of such norms which do not designate any ought behaviour for their addressees.
365.
P.E. Navarro, ‘Legal Systems and Legal Statements’, op. cit., p. 77.
366.
Ibidem, p. 78.
367.
Cf. A. Grabowski, Judicial Argumentation and Pragmatics, op. cit., pp. 190ff., and the references cited therein. We have also assumed – as one might recall – that simplicity is one of the conditions of a good clarification – cf. Chap. 6, p. 221.
368.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 291–295.
369.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 253–254.
370.
For more on the validity of norms applied according to the rules of intertemporal law see Chap. 9 at pp. 506–511.
371.
Let us recall that judges sometimes apply the law, which, in the light of a subsequent constitutional court’s ruling, turns out not to be invalid – cf. Chap. 7, p. 319.
372.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 356–357. The justification of the importance of “intrinsic added value” in the clarificative analysis also refers to one of the requirements of a good clarification; namely, its scientific fruitfulness – cf. Chap. 5, p. 221.
373.
See Chap. 9, pp. 484ff.
374.
See e.g., N. Jääskinen, ‘External Justification of Propositions in Legal Science’ in E. Bulygin et al. (eds.), Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life, op. cit., pp. 227ff. Cf. Chap. 9, pp. 500–502.
375.
It should be emphasised that the similarity of validity discourse to the negative theories of legal justification and – indirectly – to falsificationism is purely structural, since the juristic validity utterances are in most cases deprived of truth-value.
376.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 272–274.
377.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 271–273.
378.
Cf. supra, p. 437.
379.
Cf. supra, notes 188–191 at pp. 402–403, with the corresponding text.
380.
Cf. supra, the scheme (Fig. 8.1) at p. 424.
381.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 271–357.
382.
Cf. supra, pp. 413–422.
383.
Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 261–262.
384.
Cf. supra, p. 432.
385.
Cf. supra, pp. 422–432.
386.
Cf. supra, pp. 400–422.
387.
It is not advisable at this point to take up a new purely philosophical investigation, especially since the clarificative analysis primarily aimed at formulating a nominal rather than a real definition.
388.
For more about this category of norms from the jurisprudential perspective see J. Jabłońska-Bonca, ‘Przesłanki stanowienia norm bez sankcji’ [The Conditions for Establishing Sanction-Free Norms], RPEiS XLVI/4 (1984), pp. 151–167, and the references cited therein.
389.
See Chap. 9, pp. 529–533.
390.
A. Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable, op. cit., p. 57.
391.
As far as I know, the only study which applies the concept of validity discourse (understood intuitively) is the study of G. Sartor, ‘Legal Validity as Doxastic Obligation: From Definition to Normativity’, op. cit., pp. 590ff. Yet, the Italian theorist of law uses it in a manner different from that proposed here – cf. Chap. 9, p. 470.

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Faculty of Law and Administration, Department of Legal Theory, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
Andrzej Grabowski

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Grabowski, A. (2013). The Postpositivist Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law. In: Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0_8

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