From Research to Practice: Automated Negotiations with People

  • Raz Lin
  • Sarit Kraus
Part of the Cognitive Technologies book series (COGTECH)


The development of proficient automated agents has flourished in recent years, yet making the agents interact with people has still received little attention. This is mainly due to the unpredictable nature of people and their negotiation behavior, though complexity and costs attached to experimentation with people, starting from the design and ending with the evaluation process, is also a factor. Even so, succeeding in designing proficient automated agents remains an important objective. In recent years, we have invested much effort in facilitating the design and evaluation of automated agents interacting with people, making it more accessible to researchers. We have created two distinct environments for bargaining agents, as well as proposing a novel approach for evaluating agents. These are key factors for making automated agents become a reality rather than remain theoretical.


Utility Function Acceptance Threshold Automate Negotiation Negotiation Partner Negotiation Session 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceBar-Ilan UniversityRamat-GanIsrael
  2. 2.Institute for Advanced Computer StudiesUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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