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Malice versus AN.ON: Possible Risks of Missing Replay and Integrity Protection

  • Benedikt Westermann
  • Dogan Kesdogan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7035)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the impact of missing replay protection as well as missing integrity protection concerning a local attacker in AN.ON. AN.ON is a low latency anonymity network mostly used to anonymize web traffic. We demonstrate that both protection mechanisms are important by presenting two attacks that become feasible as soon as the mechanisms are missing. We mount both attacks on the AN.ON network which neither implements replay protection nor integrity protection yet.

Keywords

Advanced Encryption Standard Replay Attack Dedicated Server Exit Node Entry Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Benedikt Westermann
    • 1
  • Dogan Kesdogan
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Q2S, NTNUTrondheimNorway
  2. 2.IT Security, FB5University of SiegenSiegenGermany

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