Advertisement

G2C: Cryptographic Protocols from Goal-Driven Specifications

  • Michael Backes
  • Matteo Maffei
  • Kim Pecina
  • Raphael M. Reischuk
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6993)

Abstract

We present G2C, a goal-driven specification language for distributed applications. This language offers support for the declarative specification of functionality goals and security properties. The former comprise the parties, their inputs, and the goal of the communication protocol. The latter comprise secrecy, access control, and anonymity requirements. A key feature of our language is that it abstracts away from how the intended functionality is achieved, but instead lets the system designer concentrate on which functional features and security properties should be achieved. Our framework provides a compilation method for transforming G2C specifications into symbolic cryptographic protocols, which are shown to be optimal. We provide a technique to automatically verify the correctness and security of these protocols using ProVerif, a state-of-the-art automated theorem-prover for cryptographic protocols. We have implemented a G2C compiler to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach.

Keywords

Goal Node Ring Signature Security Property Cryptographic Protocol Satisfying Assignment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. 1.
    Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Mobile Values, New Names, and Secure Communication. In: POPL 2001 (2001)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Abadi, M., Gordon, A.D.: A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus. In: CCS 1997. ACM, New York (1997)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Abadi, M., Needham, R.: Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 22(1) (1996)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Backes, M., Grochulla, M.P., Hriţcu, C., Maffei, M.: Achieving security despite compromise using zero-knowledge. In: CSF 2009. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Barth, A., Datta, A., Mitchell, J.C., Nissenbaum, H.: Privacy and Contextual Integrity: Framework and Applications. In: SP 2006. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2006)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Bhargavan, K., Corin, R., Deniélou, P.-M., Fournet, C., Leifer, J.J.: Cryptographic protocol synthesis and verification for multiparty sessions. In: CSF 2009. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Blanchet, B.: An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on Prolog rules. In: CSFW 2001 (2001)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Bleichenbacher, D.: Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 1–12. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Boneh, D., Gentry, C., Waters, B.: Collusion resistant broadcast encryption with short ciphertexts and private keys. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 258–275. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Boneh, D., Waters, B.: A fully collusion resistant broadcast, trace, and revoke system. In: CCS 2006. ACM, New York (2006)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Butler, F., Cervesato, I., Jaggard, A.D., Scedrov, A., Walstad, C.: Formal analysis of Kerberos 5. Theoretical Computer Science, 367(1) (2006)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Chandran, N., Groth, J., Sahai, A.: Ring signatures of sub-linear size without random oracles. In: Arge, L., Cachin, C., Jurdziński, T., Tarlecki, A. (eds.) ICALP 2007. LNCS, vol. 4596, pp. 423–434. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Chen, W., Clarke, L., Kurose, J., Towsley, D.: Optimizing cost-sensitive trust-negotiation protocols. In: INFOCOM 2005, pp. 1431–1442. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2005)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Chong, S., Liu, J., Myers, A.C., Qi, X., Vikram, K., Zheng, L., Zheng, X.: Secure web applications via automatic partitioning. SIGOPS Operating System Review 41 (2007)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Ciriani, V., De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Foresti, S., Samarati, P.: k-Anonymity. Secure Data Management in Decentralized Systems 33 (2007)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Corin, R., Deniélou, P.-M.: A protocol compiler for secure sessions in ml. In: Barthe, G., Fournet, C. (eds.) TGC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4912, pp. 276–293. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Corin, R., Deniélou, P.-M., Fournet, C., Bhargavan, K., Leifer, J.: Secure implementations for typed session abstractions. In: CSF 2007 (2007)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Denning, D.E.: A Lattice Model of Secure Information Flow. Communications of the ACM 19(5) (1976)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Denning, D.E., Sacco, G.M.: Timestamps in key distribution protocols. Communications of the ACM 24(8) (1981)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Fiat, A., Naor, M.: Broadcast encryption. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 480–491. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Fisher, D.: Millions of .Net Passport accounts put at risk. eWeek (2003)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Fournet, C., Guernic, G.L., Rezk, T.: A security-preserving compiler for distributed programs: From information-flow policies to cryptographic mechanisms. In: CCS 2009. ACM, New York (2009)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
  24. 24.
    Gecode: generic constraint development environment (2011), http://www.gecode.org
  25. 25.
    Ghallab, M., Nau, D., Traverso, P.: Automated Planning: Theory and Practice. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco (2004)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Herranz, J.: Identity-based ring signatures from RSA. Theoretical Computer Science 389 (2007)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Jia, L., Vaughan, J.A., Mazurak, K., Zhao, J., Zarko, L., Schorr, J., Zdancewic, S.: AURA: A Programming Language for Authorization and Audit. In: ICFP 2008, ACM, New York (2008)Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Liu, J., George, M.D., Vikram, K., Qi, X., Waye, L., Myers, A.C.: Fabric: A platform for secure distributed computation and storage. In: SOSP 2009. ACM, New York (2009)Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Loo, B.T., Condie, T., Garofalakis, M., Gay, D.E., Hellerstein, J.M., Maniatis, P., Ramakrishnan, R., Roscoe, T., Stoica, I.: Declarative Networking: Language, Execution and Optimization. In: SIGMOD 2006. ACM, New York (2006)Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Loo, B.T., Condie, T., Hellerstein, J.M., Maniatis, P., Roscoe, T., Stoica, I.: Implementing Declarative Overlays. In: Herbert, A., Birman, K.P. (eds.) SOSP 2005. ACM, New York (2005)Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Lowe, G.: Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds.) TACAS 1996. LNCS, vol. 1055, pp. 147–166. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. 32.
    Milner, R.: Communicating and Mobile Systems: The Pi-Calculus. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1999)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  33. 33.
    Myers, A., Liskov, B.: Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (2000)Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Navarro, J.A., Rybalchenko, A.: Operational semantics for declarative networking. In: Gill, A., Swift, T. (eds.) PADL 2009. LNCS, vol. 5418, pp. 76–90. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. 35.
    Necula, G.C.: Translation validation for an optimizing compiler. ACM SIGPLAN Notices 35(5) (2000)Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Ocenasek, P., Sveda, M.: An approach to automated design of security protocols. In: ICMLS 2006 (2006)Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Pnueli, A., Siegel, M., Singerman, E.: Translation validation. In: Steffen, B. (ed.) TACAS 1998. LNCS, vol. 1384, pp. 151–166. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. 38.
    Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., Tauman, Y.: How to leak a secret. Communications of the ACM 22(22) (2001)Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.C.: Language-Based Information Flow Security. IEEE Journal on Selected Area in Communications 21(1) (2003)Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    Sprenger, C., Basin, D.: Developing security protocols by refinement. In: CCS 2010. ACM, New York (2010)Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    Sweeney, L.: k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy. International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems 10(5) (2002)Google Scholar
  42. 42.
    Tristan, J.-B., Leroy, X.: Formal verification of translation validators: A case study on instruction scheduling optimizations. In: POPL 1908. ACM, New York (2008)Google Scholar
  43. 43.
    US Depart. of Health & Human Services. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Privacy Rule (2009), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy
  44. 44.
    Vaughan, J.A.: A confidentiality extension to the Aura programming language. In: TLDI 2011. ACM, New York (2011)Google Scholar
  45. 45.
    Volpano, D., Smith, G., Irvine, C.: A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysis. Journal of Computer Security 4(2-3) (1996)Google Scholar
  46. 46.
    Wagner, D., Schneier, B.: Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol. In: EC 1996 (1996)Google Scholar
  47. 47.
    Xue, H., Zhang, H., Qing, S.: A schema of automated design security protocols. In: CISW 2007 (2007)Google Scholar
  48. 48.
    Zhou, W., Mao, Y., Loo, B.T., Abadi, M.: Unified Declarative Platform for Secure Networked Information Systems. In: ICDE 2009. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2009)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Backes
    • 1
    • 2
  • Matteo Maffei
    • 1
  • Kim Pecina
    • 1
  • Raphael M. Reischuk
    • 1
  1. 1.Saarland UniversitySaarbrückenGermany
  2. 2.Max Planck Institute for Software Systems (MPI-SWS)Germany

Personalised recommendations