Advertisement

Securing Lightweight Block Cipher against Power Analysis Attacks

  • Yang Han
  • Yongbin Zhou
  • Jiye Liu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 143)

Abstract

Side-channel attacks are cryptanalytic methods against cryptographic implementations. Such implementations running on resource constrained devices are particularly vulnerable to these attacks. In this context, every legal user has a full control over these devices and thus be capable of tampering with them at his own will. The hostile environments within which lightweight block cipher implementations are working determine that their physical security are seriously threatened by side-channel attacks, especially power analysis attacks. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerabilities of lightweight block cipher implementations on resource constrained devices against power analysis attacks, and then propose an algorithmic countermeasure called Bitwisely Balanced enCoding (BBC). Taking LBlock and PRESENT as two cases of study, we perform simulation experiments, and the results show that BBC countermeasure can obtain high security with reasonable cost.

Keywords

Side-Channel Analysis Lightweight Block Cipher Bitwisely Balanced enCoding Power Analysis Attack Countermeasure 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Kocher, P.C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential Power Analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bogdanov, A., Knudsen, L.R., Leander, G., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M.J.B., Seurin, Y., Vikkelsoe, C.: PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher. In: Paillier, P., Verbauwhede, I. (eds.) CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 450–466. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Wu, W., Zhang, L.: LBlock: A Lightweight Block Cipher. In: Lopez, J., Tsudik, G. (eds.) ACNS 2011. LNCS, vol. 6715, pp. 327–344. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Messerges, T.S.: Securing the AES Finalists Against Power Analysis Attacks. In: Schneier, B. (ed.) FSE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1978, pp. 150–301. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Oswald, E., Preneel, B.: A Theoretical Evaluation of some NESSIE Candidates regarding their Susceptibility towards Power Analysis Attacks (2002)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Hoogvorst, P., Duc, G., Danger, J.L.: Software Implementation of Dual-Rail Representation. In: Schindler, W. (ed.) COSADE (2011)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Standaert, F.X., Malkin, T.G., Yung, M.: A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks. In: Joux, A., May, A. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 443–461. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Gierlichs, B., Batina, L., Preneel, B., Verbauwhede, I.: Revisiting Higher-Order DPA Attacks: Multivariate Mutual Information Analysis. In: Pieprzyk, J. (ed.) CT-RSA 2010. LNCS, vol. 5985, pp. 221–234. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Mangard, S., Oswald, E., Popp, T.: Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Standaert, F. X., Charvillon, N.V., Oswald, E., Gierlichs, B., Medwed, M., Kasper, M., Mangard, S.: The World Is Not Enough: Another Look on Second-Order DPA. In: Abe, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6477, pp. 112–129. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.BeijingP.R. China

Personalised recommendations