Load Time Security Verification

  • Olga Gadyatskaya
  • Eduardo Lostal
  • Fabio Massacci
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7093)


Modern multi-application smart cards can be an integrated environment where applications from different providers are loaded on the fly and collaborate in order to facilitate lives of the cardholders. This initiative requires an embedded verification mechanism to ensure that all applications on the card respect the application interactions policy.

The Security-by-Contract approach for loading time verification consists of two phases. During the first phase the loaded code is verified to be compliant with the supplied contract. Then, during the second phase the contract is matched with the smart card security policy. The paper focuses on the first phase and describes an algorithm for static analysis of the loaded bytecode on Java Card. The paper also reports about implementation of this algorithm that can be embedded on a real smart card.


Smart Card Security Policy Object Reference Application Code Dynamic Scenario 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Avvenuti, M., Bernardeschi, C., De Francesco, N.: Java bytecode verification for secure information flow. SIGPLAN Not. 38, 20–27 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bieber, P., Cazin, J., Wiels, V., Zanon, G., Girard, P., Lanet, J.-L.: Checking secure interactions of smart card applets: Extended version. J. of Comp. Sec. 10(4), 369–398 (2002)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Dragoni, N., Lostal, E., Gadyatskaya, O., Massacci, F., Paci, F.: A load time Policy Checker for open multi-application smart cards. In: Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (2011)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Dragoni, N., Massacci, F., Naliuka, K., Siahaan, I.: Security-by-contract: Toward a semantics for digital signatures on mobile code. In: López, J., Samarati, P., Ferrer, J.L. (eds.) EuroPKI 2007. LNCS, vol. 4582, pp. 297–312. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Fontaine, A., Hym, S., Simplot-Ryl, I.: On-device control flow verification for java programs. In: Erlingsson, Ú., Wieringa, R., Zannone, N. (eds.) ESSoS 2011. LNCS, vol. 6542, pp. 43–57. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Fontaine, A., Hym, S., Simplot-Ryl, I., Gadyatskaya, O., Massacci, F., Paci, F., Jurgens, J., Ochoa, M.: D6.3 Compositional technique to verify adaptive security at loading time on device. SecureChange EU project public deliverable (2010),
  7. 7.
    Gadyatskaya, O., Lostal, E., Massacci, F.: Load time security verification. The Claim Checker. Technical Report DISI-11-471. On the web, at
  8. 8.
    Ghindici, D., Simplot-Ryl, I.: On Practical Information Flow Policies for Java-Enabled Multiapplication Smart Cards. In: Grimaud, G., Standaert, F.-X. (eds.) CARDIS 2008. LNCS, vol. 5189, pp. 32–47. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Girard, P.: Which security policy for multiplication smart cards? In: USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology. USENIX Association (1999)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Huisman, M., Gurov, D., Sprenger, C., Chugunov, G.: Checking Absence of Illicit Applet Interactions: A Case Study. In: Wermelinger, M., Margaria-Steffen, T. (eds.) FASE 2004. LNCS, vol. 2984, pp. 84–98. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Sun Microsystems. Virtual Machine and Runtime Environment. Java CardTM platform. Specification 2.2.2, Sun Microsystems (2006)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Schellhorn, G., Reif, W., Schairer, A., Karger, P., Austel, V., Toll, D.: Verification of a formal security model for multiapplicative smart cards. In: Cuppens, F., Deswarte, Y., Gollmann, D., Waidner, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2000. LNCS, vol. 1895, pp. 17–36. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Philips Semiconductors. P5CT072 Secure Dual Interface PKI Smart Card Controller. On the web, at

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olga Gadyatskaya
    • 1
  • Eduardo Lostal
    • 1
  • Fabio Massacci
    • 1
  1. 1.DISIUniversity of TrentoItaly

Personalised recommendations