TruWalletM: Secure Web Authentication on Mobile Platforms

  • Sven Bugiel
  • Alexandra Dmitrienko
  • Kari Kostiainen
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
  • Marcel Winandy
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6802)

Abstract

Mobile phones are increasingly used as general purpose computing devices with permanent Internet connection. This imposes several threats as the phone operating system (OS) is typically derived from desktop counterparts and, hence, inherits the same or similar security shortcomings. In particular, the protection of login credentials when accessing web services becomes crucial under phishing and malware attacks. On the other hand many modern mobile phones provide hardware-supported security mechanisms currently unused by most phone OSs.

In this paper, we show how to use these mechanisms, in particular trusted execution environments, to protect the user’s login credentials. We present the design and implementation proposal (based on Nokia N900 mobile platform) of TruWalletM, a wallet-like password manager and authentication agent towards the protection of login credentials on a mobile phone without the need to trust the whole OS software. We preserve compatibility to existing standard web authentication mechanisms.

Keywords

Authentication Protocol Mobile Platform User Credential Trusted Platform Module Transport Layer Security 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sven Bugiel
    • 1
  • Alexandra Dmitrienko
    • 2
  • Kari Kostiainen
    • 3
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 1
  • Marcel Winandy
    • 2
  1. 1.Fraunhofer-Institut SIT DarmstadtTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.System Security LabRuhr-University BochumGermany
  3. 3.Nokia Research CenterHelsinkiFinland

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