Minimising Anonymity Loss in Anonymity Networks under DoS Attacks

  • Mu Yang
  • Vladimiro Sassone
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7043)


Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance as it helps to protect users’ privacy by ensuring that their identity remains unknown. Anonymity protocols generally suffer from denial of service (DoS) attack, as repeated message retransmission affords more opportunities for attackers to analyse traffic and lower the protocols’ privacy. In this paper, we analyse how users can minimise their anonymity loss under DoS attacks by choosing to remove or keep ‘failed’ nodes from router lists. We also investigate the strategy effectiveness in those cases where users cannot decide whether the ‘failed’ node are the targets of DoS attacks.


Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Target Node Failed Node Malicious User 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Backes, M., Lorenz, S., Maffei, M., Pecina, K.: Anonymous Webs of Trust. In: Atallah, M.J., Hopper, N.J. (eds.) PETS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6205, pp. 130–148. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bauer, K., McCoy, D., Grunwald, D., Kohno, T., Sicker, D.: Low-resource routing attacks against tor. In: Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society, WPES 2007, pp. 11–20. ACM, New York (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Borisov, N., Danezis, G., Mittal, P., Tabriz, P.: Denial of service or denial of security? In: Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2007, pp. 92–102. ACM, New York (2007)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C.: Probable innocence revisited. Theor. Comput. Sci. 367(1-2), 123–138 (2006)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Commun. ACM 24(2), 84–88 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Damiani, E., di Vimercati, S.D.C., Paraboschi, S., Pesenti, M., Samarati, P., Zara, S.: Fuzzy logic techniques for reputation management in anonymous peer-to-peer systems. In: Wagenknecht, M., Hampel, R. (eds.) Proceedings of the 3rd Conference of the European Society for Fuzzy Logic and Technology, pp. 43–48 (2003)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Dingledine, R., Freedman, M.J., Hopwood, D., Molnar, D.: A Reputation System to Increase Mix-net Reliability. In: Moskowitz, I.S. (ed.) IH 2001. LNCS, vol. 2137, pp. 126–141. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N.: Anonymity loves company: Usability and the network effect. In: Proceedings of the Fifth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, WEIS 2006 (2006)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., Syverson, P.F.: Tor: The second-generation onion router. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 303–320. USENIX (2004)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Dingledine, R., Syverson, P.F.: Reliable MIX Cascade Networks through Reputation. In: Blaze, M. (ed.) FC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2357, pp. 253–268. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Freedman, M.J., Morris, R.: Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer. In: Atluri, V. (ed.) ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 193–206. ACM (2002)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. MIT Press (1991)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Golle, P., Juels, A.: Parallel mixing. In: Atluri, V., Pfitzmann, B., McDaniel, P.D. (eds.) ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 220–226. ACM (2004)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Hopper, N., Vasserman, E.Y., Chan-Tin, E.: How much anonymity does network latency leak? ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 13(2) (2010)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Jakobsson, M.: Flash mixing. In: Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 1999, pp. 83–89 (1999)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    McLachlan, J., Tran, A., Hopper, N., Kim, Y.: Scalable onion routing with Torsk. In: Al-Shaer, E., Jha, S., Keromytis, A.D. (eds.) ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 590–599. ACM (2009)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Murdoch, S.J., Danezis, G.: Low-cost traffic analysis of tor. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 183–195. IEEE Computer Society (2005)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Nambiar, A., Wright, M.: Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity. In: Juels, A., Wright, R.N., di Vimercati, S.D.C. (eds.) ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 17–26. ACM (2006)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Neff, C.A.: A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 116–125 (2001)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Øverlier, L., Syverson, P.F.: Improving Efficiency and Simplicity of Tor Circuit Establishment and Hidden Services. In: Borisov, N., Golle, P. (eds.) PET 2007. LNCS, vol. 4776, pp. 134–152. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Pappas, V., Athanasopoulos, E., Ioannidis, S., Markatos, E.P.: Compromising Anonymity Using Packet Spinning. In: Wu, T.-C., Lei, C.-L., Rijmen, V., Lee, D.-T. (eds.) ISC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5222, pp. 161–174. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Ray, S., Slutzki, G., Zhang, Z.: Incentive-driven P2P anonymity system: A game-theoretic approach. In: ICPP, p. 63. IEEE Computer Society (2007)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Reiter, M.K., Rubin, A.D.: Crowds: Anonymity for web transactions. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 1(1), 66–92 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Sassone, V., Hamadou, S., Yang, M.: Trust in Anonymity Networks. In: Gastin, P., Laroussinie, F. (eds.) CONCUR 2010. LNCS, vol. 6269, pp. 48–70. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Singh, A., Liu, L.: Trustme: Anonymous management of trust relationships in decentralized P2P systems. In: Shahmehri, N., Graham, R.L., Caronni, G. (eds.) Peer-to-Peer Computing, pp. 142–149. IEEE Computer Society (2003)Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Wang, Y., Vassileva, J.: Trust and reputation model in peer-to-peer networks. In: Shahmehri, N., Graham, R.L., Caronni, G. (eds.) Peer-to-Peer Computing. IEEE Computer Society (2003)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Zhuang, L., Zhou, F., Zhao, B.Y., Rowstron, A.I.T.: Cashmere: Resilient anonymous routing. In: NSDI. USENIX (2005)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mu Yang
    • 1
  • Vladimiro Sassone
    • 1
  1. 1.ECSUniversity of SouthamptonUK

Personalised recommendations