Complexity of Rational and Irrational Nash Equilibria
We introduce two new decision problems, denoted as ∃ RATIONAL NASH and ∃ IRRATIONAL NASH, pertinent to the rationality and irrationality, respectively, of Nash equilibria for (finite) strategic games. These problems ask, given a strategic game, whether or not it admits (i) a rational Nash equilibrium where all probabilities are rational numbers, and (ii) an irrational Nash equilibrium where at least one probability is irrational, respectively. We are interested here in the complexities of ∃ RATIONAL NASH and ∃ IRRATIONAL NASH.
Towards this end, we study two other decision problems, denoted as NASH-EQUIVALENCE and NASH-REDUCTION, pertinent to some mutual properties of the sets of Nash equilibria of two given strategic games with the same number of players. NASH-EQUIVALENCE asks whether the two sets of Nash equilibria coincide; we identify a restriction of its complementary problem that witnesses ∃ RATIONAL NASH. NASH-REDUCTION asks whether or not there is a so called Nash reduction (a suitable map between corresponding strategy sets of players) that yields a Nash equilibrium of the former game from a Nash equilibrium of the latter game; we identify a restriction of it that witnesses ∃ IRRATIONAL NASH.
As our main result, we provide two distinct reductions to simultaneously show that (i) NASH-EQUIVALENCE is co-\(\cal NP\)-hard and ∃ RATIONAL NASH is \(\cal NP\)-hard, and (ii) NASH-REDUCTION and ∃ IRRATIONAL NASH are \(\cal NP\)-hard, respectively. The reductions significantly extend techniques previously employed by Conitzer and Sandholm [6, 7].
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Decision Problem Mixed Strategy Surjective Mapping Positive Instance
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Abbott, T., Kane, D., Valiant, P.: On the Complexity of Two-Player Win-Lose Games. In: Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Sciences, pp. 113–122 (October 2005)Google Scholar
- 2.Austrin, P., Braverman, M., Chlamtáč, E.: Inapproximability of NP-complete Variants of Nash Equilibrium, arXiv:1104.3760v1, April 19 (2001)Google Scholar
- 4.Chen, X., Deng, X., Teng, S.H.: Settling the Complexity of Computing Two-Player Nash Equilibria. Journal of the ACM 56(3) (2009)Google Scholar
- 6.Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 18th Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 765–771 (August 2003)Google Scholar
- 11.Garey, M.R., Graham, R.L., Johnson, D.S.: Some NP-complete geometric problems. In: Proceedings of the 8th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 10–22 (1976)Google Scholar
- 14.Koutsoupias, E.: Personal communication during. In: 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, Paphos, Cyprus (October 2009)Google Scholar