A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing
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- Jain N., Menache I., Naor J.., Yaniv J. (2011) A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing. In: Persiano G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6982. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
We introduce a novel pricing and resource allocation approach for batch jobs on cloud systems. In our economic model, users submit jobs with a value function that specifies willingness to pay as a function of job due dates. The cloud provider in response allocates a subset of these jobs, taking into advantage the flexibility of allocating resources to jobs in the cloud environment. Focusing on social-welfare as the system objective (especially relevant for private or in-house clouds), we construct a resource allocation algorithm which provides a small approximation factor that approaches 2 as the number of servers increases. An appealing property of our scheme is that jobs are allocated non-preemptively, i.e., jobs run in one shot without interruption. This property has practical significance, as it avoids significant network and storage resources for checkpointing. Based on this algorithm, we then design an efficient truthful-in-expectation mechanism, which significantly improves the running complexity of black-box reduction mechanisms that can be applied to the problem, thereby facilitating its implementation in real systems.
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