Scheduling without Payments

  • Elias Koutsoupias
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_14

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6982)
Cite this paper as:
Koutsoupias E. (2011) Scheduling without Payments. In: Persiano G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6982. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


We consider mechanisms without payments for the problem of scheduling unrelated machines. Specifically, we consider truthful in expectation randomized mechanisms under the assumption that a machine (player) is bound by its reports: when a machine lies and reports value \(\tilde{t}_{ij}\) for a task instead of the actual one tij, it will execute for time \(\tilde{t}_{ij}\) if it gets the task—unless the declared value \(\tilde{t}_{ij}\) is less than the actual value tij, in which case, it will execute for time tij. Our main technical result is an optimal mechanism for one task and n players which has approximation ratio (n + 1)/2. We also provide a matching lower bound, showing that no other truthful mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio. This immediately gives an approximation ratio of (n + 1)/2 and n(n + 1)/2 for social cost and makespan minimization, respectively, for any number of tasks.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elias Koutsoupias
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of InformaticsUniversity of AthensGreece

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