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Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation

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Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 6982))

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Abstract

A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a far-reaching structural connection between Pareto optimal and perfect partitions that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. In particular, we show that computing and verifying Pareto optimal partitions in general hedonic games and B-hedonic games is intractable while both problems are tractable for roommate games and W-hedonic games. The latter two positive results are obtained by reductions to maximum weight matching and clique packing, respectively.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, 80538, München, Germany

    Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt & Paul Harrenstein

Authors
  1. Haris Aziz
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  2. Felix Brandt
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  3. Paul Harrenstein
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni Università di Salerno, 84084, Fisciano, SA, Italy

    Giuseppe Persiano

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Aziz, H., Brandt, F., Harrenstein, P. (2011). Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation. In: Persiano, G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6982. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24828-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24829-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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