Developing Simon’s Bounded Rationality

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Abstract

Herbert Simon is the father of the empirically based microeconomics. His economic theory is founded on a new concept of economic rationality. Herbert Simon’s contribution to the theory of economic rationality can be characterized by one pars destruens and one part costruens. The first part is the attack to the neoclassical Olympic rationality. The second is the proposal of an empirically based bounded rationality theory. In this chapter I will develop and assess the first and second contribution of Simon showing that while the first is justified theoretically and empirically the second shows some serious flaws.

Keywords

True Belief Rationality Concept Bounded Rationality Reflective Equilibrium Inferential Rationality 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rosselli FoundationTorinoItaly

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