Brain, Mind and Social Action

Chapter

Abstract

The aim of social sciences is to understand human behavior (Taylor 1985). Whether setting out to explain an institution like marriage, an organization like a political party or a practice such as cheerleading in sport, the starting point is always the same: to understand the significance of such phenomena for the individual and how, beginning from a single action, they have been generated or could be generated through the aggregation or interaction of multiple actions.

Keywords

Social Cognition Mirror Neuron Propositional Attitude Cognitive Approach Intentional Content 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rosselli FoundationTorinoItaly

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