Advertisement

The Mind-Society Problem

  • Riccardo Viale
Chapter

Abstract

In most methodologies of social sciences one of the crucial problems is the relationship between mental and social phenomena. Often the problem is mediated by concepts like individual action or decision. In other cases the problem is implicit or even hidden. Nevertheless, every methodology of social sciences must, sooner or later, “cross the street” that connects mind and society. In the same way as the parallel mind–body problem, the mind-society problem concerns a number of variegated fundamental philosophical questions. These are metaphysical when they deal with the existence of one or more ontological levels of reality between mind and society; with the efficacy of social causation as distinct from individual mental causation; with the feature of social properties as second order properties compared to the first order mental properties; with supervenience, epiphenomenalism or realizationism between the mental and social dimensions; and so on. They are epistemological when they privilege the problem of explanation and representation. Can we explain social phenomena by connection with other social events or only by reduction to individual mental phenomena? Can we establish genuinely autonomous scientific laws at the social level or should they only be derived from the laws that represent the psychological dimension?

Keywords

Causal Relation Social Phenomenon Prospect Theory Mental Property Rational Choice Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Anderson, J. A., & Rosenfeld, E. (1988). Neurocomputing: Foundations of research. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  2. Armstrong, D. H. (1968). A materialist theory of the mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  3. Boudon, R. (1994). The art of self persuasion. London: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  4. Bunge, M. (1980). From neuron to behaviour and mentation. New York: Raven press.Google Scholar
  5. Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. J. (1985). Pragmatic reasoning schemas. Cognitive Psychology, 17, 391–416.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Cheng, P. W., & Holyoak, K. J. (1989). On the natural selection of reasoning theories. Cognition, 33, 285–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Churchland, P. M. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Churchland, P. M. (1995). The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: A philosophical journey into the brain. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  9. Churchland, P. M. (1998). The neural representation of the social world. In P. A. Danielson (Ed.), Modelling rationality, morality and evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Churchland, P. S., & Sejnowski, T. (1992). The computational brain. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  11. Dennett, D. (1978). Brainstorms. Montgomery: Bradford Books.Google Scholar
  12. Field, A. (1977). Logic meaning and conceptual role. Journal of Philosophy, 74, 379–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. New York: Cromwell.Google Scholar
  14. Fodor, J. (1990). A theory of content and other essays. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  15. Frege, G. (1982). Uber Sinn und Bedeutung in Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Philosopische Kritik. Google Scholar
  16. Gazzaniga, M. S., Ivry, R. B., & Mangun, G. R. (2002). Cognitive neuroscience. New York: Norton & Company.Google Scholar
  17. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretations of cultures. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  18. Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious. New York: Viking Press.Google Scholar
  19. Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P., and the ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behaviour. An introduction to behaviour theory. New York: Appletan Century.Google Scholar
  21. Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
  22. Jervis, R. (1992). Political implications of loss aversion. Political Psychology, 13, 187–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Johnson Laird, P. (1983). Mental models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  24. Johnson Laird, P. (1988). The computer and the mind. London: William Collins Sons & Co. Italian Translation, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1990.Google Scholar
  25. Johnson Laird, P., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1990). Deduction. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.Google Scholar
  26. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  27. Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a physical world. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  28. Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world. In P. Kitcher & W. C. Salmon (Eds.), Scientific explanation (pp. 410–505). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  29. Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  30. Newell, A. (1990). Unified theory of cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgement. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Italian Translation, 1989, Bologna: Il Mulino.Google Scholar
  32. Popkin, S. (1979). The rational peasant. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  33. Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer International.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Quattrone, C., & Tversky, A. (1988). Contrasting rational and psychological analysis of political choice. American Political Science Review, 82, 719–736.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchison.Google Scholar
  36. Schelling, T. (1966). Arms and influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  37. Sellars, W. (1963). Science, perception and reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  38. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behaviour. New York: Mac Millan.Google Scholar
  39. Smith, E. E., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2007). Cognitive psychology. Mind and brain.. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson-Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  40. Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophy and the human sciences: Philosophical papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Tetlock, P. (2005). Expert political judgement. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  42. Tversky, A., & Kanheman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decision. Journal of Business, 59, S51–S278.Google Scholar
  43. Viale, R. (1992/2008). Cognitive constraints of economic rationality. In H. Simon, M. Egidi, R. Marris, & R. Viale (Eds.), Economics, bounded rationality and the cognitive revolution. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
  44. Viale, R. (1994a). Dans la Boîte noire: les mécanismes cognitifs de la décision scientifique. In R. Boudon & M. Clavelin (Eds.), Le rélativisme est-il résistible? Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
  45. Viale, R. (1995). Alcune considerazioni epistemologiche e cognitive sul rapporto tra scienza ed arte, Ricerca scientifica ed educazione permanente, 102.Google Scholar
  46. Viale, R. (1997b). From neoclassical to cognitive economics: The epistemological constraints of feasibility and realism. In R. Viale (Ed.), Cognitive economics. Quaderni lascomes 1, lascomes series. Torino: La Rosa Editrice.Google Scholar
  47. Viale, R. (1999). Causal cognition and causal realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13(2), 151–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Weber, M. (1949). The methodology of the social sciences. Glencoe: Free Press.Google Scholar
  49. Wolf, A. (1978). Gods, ghosts and ancestors. In A. Wolf (Ed.), Studies in Chinese society. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rosselli FoundationTorinoItaly

Personalised recommendations