Psychologism and Antipsychologism

  • Riccardo Viale


The social sciences focus on the effect of man’s actions. Whether these regard immigration, employment, financial markets, technological innovation or political elections, any phenomenon that is the aggregate outcome of individual behaviour involving choice and human action is studied by a particular branch of the social sciences.


Social Phenomenon Social Player Methodological Individualism Explanatory Individualism Italian Translation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rosselli FoundationTorinoItaly

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