Adaptive Theory Change as Epistemological Universal

  • Riccardo Viale


Human beings often accept beliefs and reasons in ways that are considered irrational because they do not conform to given canons of rationality. These conventional canons stem, generally, from the main formal models of deduction and induction. There is a great deal of dissatisfaction in accepting this kind of normative judgement. The acceptance of a particular formal canon seems arbitrary and its foundation generates the well known “trilemma of Münchausen” (Albert 1968). This uneasiness has produced two different reactions. The first is the nihilist one. There is no need to establish any normative account of rationality because “anything goes” and every reason should be accepted. The second is what can be labelled, to a great extent, as a “naturalizing epistemology” programme (Quine 1969). According to it, the normative account of rationality should be generated by the descriptive account of how individuals reason and generate their beliefs.


Diversity Principle Causal Attribution Theory Change Deductive Reasoning Ulnar Artery 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rosselli FoundationTorinoItaly

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