Biology and Culture of Human Inference

Chapter

Abstract

In the past philosophers used to put infants and children on the opposite side from science in the spectrum of cognitive rationality. Their supposed cognitive immaturity did not allow them to approach the ideal image of rational beings.

Keywords

Diversity Principle Cognitive Style Causal Attribution Theory Change Ulnar Artery 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rosselli FoundationTorinoItaly

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