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Introduction

  • Riccardo Viale
Chapter

Abstract

The volume is divided into three parts and 14 chapters. The Introduction will summarize the various chapters of the volume. Part I “Cognitive Rationality and Society” deals with the philosophical justification of methodological cognitivism.

Keywords

Cognitive Science Mirror Neuron Theory Change Bounded Rationality Neoclassical Economic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rosselli FoundationTorinoItaly

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