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From DSS to MILS

(Extended Abstract)
  • John Rushby
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6875)

Abstract

I outline the principal ideas of the Distributed Secure System (DSS) on which Brian Randell and I collaborated in the early 1980s, its modern manifestation as MILS, and continuing research challenges posed by these architectures.

Keywords

Release Agent Separation Kernel Distribute Secure System Computer Science Laboratory Annual Computer Security Application 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Rushby
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science LaboratorySRI InternationalMenlo ParkUSA

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