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Type-Based Automated Verification of Authenticity in Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNPSE,volume 6996)

Abstract

Gordon and Jeffrey developed a type system for verification of asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic protocols. We propose a modified version of Gordon and Jeffrey’s type system and develop a type inference algorithm for it, so that protocols can be verified automatically as they are, without any type annotations or explicit type casts. We have implemented a protocol verifier SpiCA2 based on the algorithm, and confirmed its effectiveness.

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  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-24372-1_7
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Dahl, M., Kobayashi, N., Sun, Y., Hüttel, H. (2011). Type-Based Automated Verification of Authenticity in Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols. In: Bultan, T., Hsiung, PA. (eds) Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis. ATVA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6996. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24372-1_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24372-1_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24371-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24372-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)