Abstract
We describe a novel reformulation of Canetti’s Universal Composability (UC) framework for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Our framework is different mainly in that it is (a) based on systems of interactive Turing machines with a fixed communication graph and (b) augmented with a global message queue that allows the sending of multiple messages per activation. The first feature significantly simplifies the proofs of some framework results, such as the UC theorem, while the second can lead to more natural descriptions of protocols and ideal functionalities.
Funded by the Norwegian Research Council’s VERDIKT programme project 183195.
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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Gjøsteen, K., Petrides, G., Steine, A. (2011). A Novel Framework for Protocol Analysis. In: Boyen, X., Chen, X. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6980. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24315-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24316-5
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