Randomness Leakage in the KEM/DEM Framework

  • Hitoshi Namiki
  • Keisuke Tanaka
  • Kenji Yasunaga
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6980)

Abstract

Recently, there have been many studies on constructing cryptographic primitives that are secure even if some secret information leaks. In this paper, we consider the problem of constructing public-key encryption schemes that are resilient to leaking the randomness used in the encryption algorithm. In particular, we consider the case in which public-key encryption schemes are constructed from the KEM/DEM framework, and the leakage of randomness in the encryption algorithms of KEM and DEM occurs independently. For this purpose, we define a new security notion for KEM. Then we provide a generic construction of a public-key encryption scheme that is resilient to randomness leakage from any KEM scheme satisfying this security. Also we construct a KEM scheme that satisfies the security under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Keywords

Encryption Algorithm Random String Security Notion Challenge Ciphertext Challenge Message 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hitoshi Namiki
    • 1
  • Keisuke Tanaka
    • 2
  • Kenji Yasunaga
    • 2
  1. 1.Ricoh Co., Ltd.TokyoJapan
  2. 2.Tokyo Institute of TechnologyJapan

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