Autodoxastic Conditional Reasoning: The Monotonic Case

  • Haythem O. Ismail
  • Aya S. Mahfouz
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6967)


Ramsey’s test for conditionals seems to be in conflict with the so-called Thomason conditionals. A Thomason conditional is a conditional in which either the antecedent or the consequent is a statement about the reasoning agent’s own beliefs. Several authors have pointed out that resolving the apparent conflict is to be sought by abandoning the belief revision interpretation of the Ramsey test in favor of a suppositional interpretation. We formalize an AGM-style notion of supposition, showing that it is identical to revision for agents who are not autodoxastic—agents who do not reason about their beliefs. We present particular realizations of supposition in terms of revision and identify the relations between the conditionals supposition and revision give rise to.


Function Symbol Belief Revision Algebraic Logic Context System Nonmonotonic Logic 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Haythem O. Ismail
    • 1
  • Aya S. Mahfouz
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceGerman UniversityCairoEgypt

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