Game Theoretical Aspects in Modeling and Analyzing the Shipping Industry

  • Xiaoning Shi
  • Stefan Voß
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6971)

Abstract

The shipping industry is known for providing transport service in terms of deploying vessels and accessing ports, making shipping one of the network-based services. From the perspective of traditional as well as neo-economics, shipping is assumed to pursue profit maximization subject to scarce resources, e.g. capital, assets, seafarers, or binding constraints derived from schedules, etc. Players could be any of the following: linkage operators, e.g. liner shipping carriers, port operators, freight forwarders, customs, hinterland haulage carriers, inland navigation carriers, market regulators, etc. Taking into account interdependencies and inter-relations, game theory provides a meaningful way to model and analyze behaviors of the involved players. In this paper we provide a survey on game theoretical approaches within the shipping industry.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Shipping Industry Congestion Game Liner Shipping Port Operator 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xiaoning Shi
    • 1
  • Stefan Voß
  1. 1.Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityP.R. China

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