Combinatorial Auctions in Freight Logistics

  • Heiner Ackermann
  • Hendrik Ewe
  • Herbert Kopfer
  • Karl-Heinz Küfer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6971)


Freight business is a huge market with strong competition. In many companies, planning and routing software has been introduced, and optimization potentials have been widely exploited. To further improve efficiency, especially the small and medium sized carriers have to cooperate beyond enterprise boundaries. A promising approach to exchange transportation requests between freight carriers is provided by combinatorial auctions and exchanges. They allow bundles of items to be traded, thereby allowing participants to express complex synergies.

In this paper we discuss various goals for a combinatorial request exchange in freight logistics and provide the reasoning for our design decisions. All goals aim to improve usefulness in a practical environment of less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers. We provide experimental results for both generated and real-life data that show significant savings and are often close to a heuristic solution for the global optimization problem. We study how bundling and restricting the number of submitted bids affect the solution quality.


Global Optimization Problem Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination Problem Transportation Request Bidding Agent 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heiner Ackermann
    • 1
  • Hendrik Ewe
    • 1
  • Herbert Kopfer
    • 2
  • Karl-Heinz Küfer
    • 1
  1. 1.Fraunhofer ITWMKaiserslauternGermany
  2. 2.Chair of Logistics, University BremenGermany

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