Bayesianism, Elimination Induction and Logical Reliability

  • Renjie Yang
  • Min Tang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6953)


The logic of scientific justification is a central problem in the philosophy of science. Bayesianism is usually taken as the leading theory in this area. After a brief review of Bayesian account of scientific justification and learning theorists’ objection against Bayesianism, this paper proposes an argument defending Bayesianism. It is shown that Bayesian conditionalization has the necessary equipment to capture the idea of elimination induction, which functions as an indispensible component in a satisfactory account of scientific justification.


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    Earman, J.: Bayes or Bust. Bradford-MIT, Cambridge, MA (1992)Google Scholar
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    Kelly, K., Glymour, C.: Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Justification. In: Hitchcock, C. (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, pp. 94–114. Blackwell, Malden (2004)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Renjie Yang
    • 1
  • Min Tang
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of South CarolinaColumbiaUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyRenmin University of ChinaChina

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