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Brief Announcement: Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grants Games

  • Shay Kutten
  • Ron Lavi
  • Amitabh Trehan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6950)

Abstract

A traditional distributed system was, usually, designed by some centralized manufacturer and owned by some central owner. On the other hand, many modern distributed systems (e.g., many Peer to Peer (P2P) networks) are formed when people team up to pool their resources together to form such a system. We aim to initiate an investigation into the way people make a distributed decision on the composition of such a system, with the goal of realizing high values. Intuitively, we look at settings in which, by teaming up, a node increases its utility, however, it also pays a cost that often (as mentioned later) increases with the size of the system. The right balance is achieved by the right size system.

Keywords

Strategy Nash Equilibrium Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Follow Case Study Algorithmic Game Strong Price 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shay Kutten
    • 1
  • Ron Lavi
    • 1
  • Amitabh Trehan
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of IE&MThe TechnionHaifaIsrael

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