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Formalism of Protocol Security Analysis

  • Ling Dong
  • Kefei Chen

Abstract

Formal methods are natural extensions to informal ones that have been used to analyze cryptographic protocols. First, some famous formalisms such as BAN logic, model checking and strand space are briefly introduced; then a belief multiset formalism is put forward based on the trusted freshness notion in Chapters 4, 5 and also 6, and the formalism is simple and precise for automation of security analysis.

Keywords

Medium Access Control Model Check Cryptographic Protocol Security Goal Strand Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Higher Education Press, Beijing and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ling Dong
    • 1
  • Kefei Chen
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer Science and EngineeringShanghai Jiaotong UniversityShanghaiP.R. China

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