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Learning of Coordinated Behavior

  • Dirk Helbing
Chapter
Part of the Understanding Complex Systems book series (UCS)

Abstract

In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum (”tragedy of the commons”). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present experimental results on humans playing a route choice game in a computer laboratory, which allow one to study decision behavior in repeated games beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We will focus on whether individuals manage to find a cooperative and fair solution compatible with the system-optimal road usage. We find that individuals tend towards a user equilibrium with equal travel times in the beginning. However, after many iterations, they often establish a coherent oscillatory behavior, as taking turns performs better than applying pure or mixed strategies. The resulting behavior is fair and compatible with system-optimal road usage. In spite of the complex dynamics leading to coordinated oscillations, we have identified mathematical relationships quantifying the observed transition process. Our main experimental discoveries for 2- and 4-person games can be explained with a novel reinforcement learning model for an arbitrary number of persons, which is based on past experience and trial-and-error behavior. Gains in the average payoff seem to be an important driving force for the innovation of time-dependent response patterns, i.e. the evolution of more complex strategies. Our findings are relevant for decision support systems and routing in traffic or data networks.

Keywords

Test Person Route Choice User Equilibrium Congestion Game Minority Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

D.H. is grateful for the warm hospitality of the Santa Fe Institute, where the Social Scaling Working Group Meeting in August 2003 inspired many ideas of this paper. The results shall be presented during the workshop on “Collectives Formation and Specialization in Biological and Social Systems” in Santa Fe (April 20–22, 2005).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dirk Helbing
    • 1
  1. 1.CLU E1ETH ZurichZurichSwitzerland

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