Information Theoretic and Security Analysis of a 65-Nanometer DDSLL AES S-Box

  • Mathieu Renauld
  • Dina Kamel
  • François-Xavier Standaert
  • Denis Flandre
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6917)

Abstract

In a recent work from Eurocrypt 2011, Renauld et al. discussed the impact of the increased variability in nanoscale CMOS devices on their evaluation against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we complement this work by analyzing an implementation of the AES S-box, in the DDSLL dual-rail logic style, using the same 65-nanometer technology. For this purpose, we first compare the performance results of the static CMOS and dual-rail S-boxes. We show that full custom design allows to nicely mitigate the performance drawbacks that are usually reported for dual-rail circuits. Next, we evaluate the side-channel leakages of these S-boxes, using both simulations and actual measurements. We take advantage of state-of-the-art evaluation tools, and discuss the quantity and nature (e.g. linearity) of the physical information they provide. Our results show that the security improvement of the DDSLL S-box is typically in the range of one order of magnitude (in terms of “number of traces to recover the key”). They also confirm the importance of a profiled information theoretic analysis for the worst-case security evaluation of leaking devices. They finally raise the important question whether dual-rail logic styles remain a promising approach for reducing the side-channel information leakages in front of technology scaling, as hardware constraints such as balanced routing may become increasingly challenging to fulfill, as circuit sizes tend towards the nanometer scale.

Keywords

Information Leakage Correlation Power Analysis Template Attack Current Mode Logic Logic Style 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mathieu Renauld
    • 1
  • Dina Kamel
    • 1
  • François-Xavier Standaert
    • 1
  • Denis Flandre
    • 1
  1. 1.UCL Crypto GroupUniversité catholique de LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium

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