A Combinatorial Auction Negotiation Protocol for Time-Restricted Group Decisions

  • Fabian Lang
  • Andreas Fink
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6943)

Abstract

This paper focuses on multi-agent contract formation by automated negotiation. Commonly individuals are not willing to share information or cooperate and negotiation protocols may give way to unwanted strategic behavior. Socially beneficial contract agreements require a lot of negotiation time. Furthermore, possible interdependencies of contract items lead to complex contract spaces which restrain contract agreements. Therefore, we propose a novel negotiation protocol applying combinatorial auctions for contract formation which consider interdependencies and yield a rapid decision rights allocation. Additionally, this market-based approach utilizes Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves-mechanisms which may lead to truthful preference uncovering and information sharing through bids. However, combinatorial auctions have a computational drawback: winner determination is \(\mathcal{NP}\)-hard. In simulation experiments, two approximation algorithms as well as an optimal computation are tested in comparison with an established negotiation protocol. The results show that our protocol yields an effective solution and requires very short run time.

Keywords

Social Welfare Greedy Algorithm Multiagent System Greedy Randomize Adaptive Search Procedure Incentive Compatibility 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabian Lang
    • 1
  • Andreas Fink
    • 1
  1. 1.Helmut Schmidt University HamburgGermany

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