Computations on Simple Games Using RelView
Conference paper
Abstract
Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper we present relational models of simple games and develop relational algorithms for solving some game-theoretic basic problems. The algorithms immediately can be transformed into the language of the Computer Algebra system RelView and, therefore, the system can be used to solve the problems and to visualize the results of the computations.
Keywords
Cooperative Game Coalition Formation Simple Game Winning Coalition Veto Player
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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