Enhancing Electromagnetic Attacks Using Spectral Coherence Based Cartography

  • Amine Dehbaoui
  • Victor Lomne
  • Philippe Maurine
  • Lionel Torres
  • Michel Robert
Conference paper
Part of the IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology book series (IFIPAICT, volume 360)

Abstract

Electromagnetic Aattacks hve been recently identified as an efficient technique to retrieve the secret key of cryptographic algorithms. Although similar mathematically speaking, Power or Electromagnetic Attacks have different advantages in practice. Among the advantages of EM attacks, the feasibility of attacking limited and bounded area of integrated systems is the key one. However, efficient techniques are required to localize hot spots, characterized by partially data dependent electromagnetic emissions, at which DEMA may be applied with success. This paper aims at introducing a pragmatic technique to localize quickly and efficiently these points of interest.

Keywords

Side-Channel Attacks EM emissions Coherence analysis 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amine Dehbaoui
    • 1
  • Victor Lomne
    • 1
  • Philippe Maurine
    • 1
  • Lionel Torres
    • 1
  • Michel Robert
    • 1
  1. 1.LIRMMCNRS - University of Montpellier 2MontpellierFrance

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