Abstract
Secure information flow is the problem of ensuring that the information made publicly available by a computational system does not leak information that should be kept secret. Since it is practically impossible to avoid leakage entirely, in recent years there has been a growing interest in considering the quantitative aspects of information flow, in order to measure and compare the amount of leakage. Information theory is widely regarded as a natural framework to provide firm foundations to quantitive information flow. In this notes we review the two main information-theoretic approaches that have been investigated: the one based on Shannon entropy, and the one based on Rényi min-entropy. Furthermore, we discuss some applications in the area of privacy. In particular, we consider statistical databases and the recently-proposed notion of differential privacy. Using the information-theoretic view, we discuss the bound that differential privacy induces on leakage, and the trade-off between utility and privacy.
This work has been partially supported by the project ANR-09-BLAN-0169-01 PANDA and by the INRIA DRI Equipe Associée PRINTEMPS. The work of Miguel E. Andrés has been supported by the LIX-Qualcomm postdoc fellowship.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alvim, M.S., Andrés, M.E., Chatzikokolakis, K., Degano, P., Palamidessi, C.: Differential privacy: on the trade-off between utility and information leakage. Technical report (2011), http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00580122/en/
Alvim, M.S., Chatzikokolakis, K., Degano, P., Palamidessi, C.: Differential privacy versus quantitative information flow. Technical report (2010)
Barthe, G., Köpf, B.: Information-theoretic bounds for differentially private mechanisms. In: Proc. of CSF (to appear, 2011)
Cachin, C.: Entropy Measures and Unconditional Security in Cryptography. PhD thesis (1997)
Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C., Panangaden, P.: Anonymity protocols as noisy channels. Inf. and Comp. 206(2-4), 378–401 (2008)
Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C., Panangaden, P.: On the Bayes risk in information-hiding protocols. J. of Comp. Security 16(5), 531–571 (2008)
Chaum, D.: The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology 1, 65–75 (1988)
Clark, D., Hunt, S., Malacaria, P.: Quantitative information flow, relations and polymorphic types. J. of Logic and Computation 18(2), 181–199 (2005)
Clarkson, M.R., Schneider, F.B.: Quantification of integrity, Tech. Rep. (2011), http://hdl.handle.net/1813/22012
Dodis, Y., Ostrovsky, R., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. SIAM Journal of Computing 38(1), 97–139 (2008)
Dodis, Y., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 523–540. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Dwork, C.: Differential privacy. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds.) ICALP 2006. LNCS, vol. 4052, pp. 1–12. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Dwork, C.: Differential privacy in new settings. In: Proc. of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA 2010, Austin, Texas, USA, January 17-19, pp. 174–183. SIAM, Philadelphia (2010)
Dwork, C.: A firm foundation for private data analysis. Communications of the ACM 54(1), 86–96 (2011)
Dwork, C., Lei, J.: Differential privacy and robust statistics. In: Proc. of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2009, Bethesda, MD, USA, May 31-June 2, pp. 371–380. ACM, New York (2009)
Ghosh, A., Roughgarden, T., Sundararajan, M.: Universally utility-maximizing privacy mechanisms. In: Proc. of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2009, pp. 351–360. ACM, New York (2009)
Heusser, J., Malacaria, P.: Applied quantitative information flow and statistical databases. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds.) FAST 2009. LNCS, vol. 5983, pp. 96–110. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Joinson, A.N.: Self-disclosure in computer-mediated communication: The role of self-awareness and visual anonymity. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 31(2), 177–192 (2001)
Köpf, B., Basin, D.A.: An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks. In: Proc. of CCS, pp. 286–296. ACM, New York (2007)
Köpf, B., Basin, D.A.: An information-theoretic model for adaptive side-channel attacks. In: Proc. of CCS, pp. 286–296. ACM, New York (2007)
Malacaria, P.: Assessing security threats of looping constructs. In: Proc. of POPL, pp. 225–235. ACM, New York (2007)
Malacaria, P., Chen, H.: Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different observational models. In: Proc. of PLAS, pp. 135–146. ACM, New York (2008)
Massey: Guessing and entropy. In: Proc. of ISIT, p. 204. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1994)
Moskowitz, I.S., Newman, R.E., Crepeau, D.P., Miller, A.R.: Covert channels and anonymizing networks. In: Proc. of PES, pp. 79–88. ACM, New York (2003)
Moskowitz, I.S., Newman, R.E., Syverson, P.F.: Quasi-anonymous channels. In: Proc. of CNIS, pp. 126–131. IASTED (2003)
Pliam, J.O.: On the incomparability of entropy and marginal guesswork in brute-force attacks. In: Roy, B., Okamoto, E. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1977, pp. 67–79. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Rényi, A.: On Measures of Entropy and Information. In: Proc. of the 4th Berkeley Symposium on Mathematics, Statistics, and Probability, pp. 547–561 (1961)
Shannon, C.E.: A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal 27, 379–423, 625–656 (1948)
Smith, G.: On the foundations of quantitative information flow. In: de Alfaro, L. (ed.) FOSSACS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5504, pp. 288–302. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Zhu, Y., Bettati, R.: Anonymity vs. information leakage in anonymity systems. In: Proc. of ICDCS, pp. 514–524. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2005)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Alvim, M.S., Andrés, M.E., Chatzikokolakis, K., Palamidessi, C. (2011). Quantitative Information Flow and Applications to Differential Privacy. In: Aldini, A., Gorrieri, R. (eds) Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VI. FOSAD 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6858. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23082-0_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23082-0_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23081-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23082-0
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)