Secure Computation on the Web: Computing without Simultaneous Interaction

  • Shai Halevi
  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Benny Pinkas
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6841)

Abstract

Secure computation enables mutually suspicious parties to compute a joint function of their private inputs while providing strong security guarantees. However, its use in practice seems limited. We argue that one of the reasons for this is that the model of computation on the web is not suited to the type of communication patterns needed for secure computation. Specifically, in most web scenarios clients independently connect to servers, interact with them and then leave. This rules out the use of secure computation protocols that require that all participants interact simultaneously.

We initiate a study of secure computation in a client-server model where each client connects to the server once and interacts with it, without any other client necessarily being connected at the same time. We point out some inherent limitations in this model and present definitions that capture what can be done. We also present a general feasibility result and several truly practical protocols for a number of functions of interest. All our protocols are based on standard assumptions, and we achieve security both in the semi-honest and malicious adversary models.

Keywords

Truth Table Secure Computation Homomorphic Encryption Oblivious Transfer Honest Party 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shai Halevi
    • 1
  • Yehuda Lindell
    • 2
  • Benny Pinkas
    • 2
  1. 1.IBM T.J. Watson Research CenterUSA
  2. 2.Bar-Ilan UniversityIsrael

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