Introduction

Abstract

One of the most important business activities that a company conducts are acquisitions, but they are also one of the riskiest strategic manoeuvres. Even though acquisition success factors are known, the majority of acquisitions still fail. Surprisingly, there are still no adequate theories to explain this phenomenon, despite the tremendous negative impact of these failures and the vast amount of academic and practical research on M&A. It must therefore be concluded that some supporting structural management elements are lacking; the board or the management body must not be functioning properly, and hence their interaction is rendered ineffectual. Put another way, the “ environment ”, in terms of the company’s orientation, TMT structure, power relations and interaction, is not conducive to the effective application of acquisition success factors. Thus, the key question becomes “Who is responsible for creating this environment”? Prima facie, the board of directors. Therefore, due to academic research illustrating the board of directors as the head of a firm with ultimate overall responsibility as it is defined by law, research was initiated on the topic by looking at the role of boards in acquisitions.