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Measuring the Deployment Hiccups of DNSSEC

  • Vasilis Pappas
  • Angelos D. Keromytis
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 192)

Abstract

On May 5, 2010 the last step of the DNSSEC deployment on the 13 root servers was completed. DNSSEC is a set of security extensions on the traditional DNS protocol, that aim in preventing attacks based on the authenticity and integrity of the messages. Although the transition was completed without major faults, it is not clear whether problems of smaller scale occurred. In this paper we try to quantify the effects of that transition, using as many vantage points as possible. In order to achieve that, we deployed a distributed DNS monitoring infrastructure over the PlanetLab and gathered periodic DNS lookups, performed from each of the roughly 300 nodes, during the DNSSEC deployment on the last root name server. In addition, in order to broaden our view, we also collected data using the Tor anonymity network. After analyzing all the gathered data, we observed that around 4% of the monitored networks had an interesting DNS query failure pattern, which, to the best of our knowledge, was due to the transition.

Keywords

Failure Pattern Domain Name System Exit Node Perfect Forward Secrecy Security Extension 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vasilis Pappas
    • 1
  • Angelos D. Keromytis
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science Dept.Columbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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