Estimating Collective Belief in Fixed Odds Betting

  • Weiyun Chen
  • Xin Li
  • Daniel Zeng
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6749)


Fixed odds betting is a popular mechanism in sports game betting. In this paper, we aim to decipher actual group belief on contingent future events from the dynamics of fixed odds betting. Different from previous studies, we adopt the prospect theory rather than the expected utility (EU) theory to model bettor behaviors. Thus, we do not need to make assumptions on how much each bettor stake on their preferred events. We develop a model that captures the heterogeneity of bettors with behavior parameters drawn from beta distributions. We evaluate our proposed model on a real-world dataset collected from online betting games for 2008 Olympic Game events. In the empirical study, our model significantly outperforms expert (bookmaker) predictions. Our study shows the possibility of developing a light-weight derivative prediction market upon fixed odds betting for collective information analysis and decision making.


fixed odds betting prediction markets computational experiments 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Weiyun Chen
    • 1
  • Xin Li
    • 2
  • Daniel Zeng
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.Department of Information SystemsCity University of Hong KongHong Kong, China

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