Abstract
When arguing, agents may want to discuss about the details after agreeing about the general problems. We propose to model this kind of situation using an extended argumentation framework with potential attacks. Agents negotiate about raising potential attacks or not, in order to maximize the number of their accepted arguments. The result of the negotiation process consists in the formation of coalitions composed by those agents which have found an agreement. The two proposed negotiation protocols have been implemented and an evaluation, addressed by means of experimental results, shows which combination of strategies and negotiation protocol allows the agents to optimize outcomes.
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Boella, G., Gabbay, D.M., Perotti, A., van der Torre, L., Villata, S. (2011). Argumentative Agents Negotiating on Potential Attacks. In: O’Shea, J., Nguyen, N.T., Crockett, K., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6682. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22000-5_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22000-5_30
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