Optimal Design of Bank Bankruptcy Law and the Bank Failures from the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis

  • Matej MarinčEmail author
  • Razvan Vlahu


This chapter first gathers together our proposals for optimal bank bankruptcy law. Subsequently, it reviews several cases of bank failures from the 2007–2009 financial crisis. The cases demonstrate the need for bank bankruptcy law and give the first and admittedly imprecise evidence for the validity of the proposals that we make.


Financial Crisis Financial Institution Mortgage Market Bank Failure Corporate Governance Mechanism 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Economics Department for Money and FinanceUniversity of LjubljanaLjubljanaSlovenia
  2. 2.Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)University of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.De Nederlandsche BankAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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