General Issues in Bankruptcy Law

  • Matej Marinč
  • Razvan Vlahu


The primary aim of this book is to understand bank bankruptcy law and to make suggestions on how to improve its design. In order to be able to do this, one first needs to understand the principles behind the general bankruptcy law.


Coordination Problem Free Cash Flow Debt Financing Bank Debt Debt Security 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Economics Department for Money and FinanceUniversity of LjubljanaLjubljanaSlovenia
  2. 2.Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)University of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.De Nederlandsche BankAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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